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Abstract 
The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, wheth-
er written by  historians,  social  scientists,  or commentators,  universally  accord  primary  explanatory 
importance to  the General's distinctive geopolitical  ideology.  In explaining his motivations, only sec-
ondary  significance,  if any  at all,  is  attached  to  commercial  considerations.  This paper seeks  to re· 
verse  this historiographical consensus by  examining the four  major decisions  toward European  integra-
tion during de Gaulle's presidency:  the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose 
the Foucher  Plan in  the early  1960s,  to veto British accession  to the EC,  and to provoke the "empty 
chair" crisis  in  1965-1966,  resulting  in  the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case,  the overwhelm-
ing  bulk  of the  primary  evidence-speeches,  memoirs,  or  government documents-suggests that de 
Gaulle's primary  motivation was  economic,  not geopolitical  or ideological.  Like  his  predecessors  and 
successors,  de  Gaulle sought  to promote  French  industry and agriculture by  establishing protected mar-
kets for  their export products. This empirical  finding  has three broader implications:  (1) For  those  in· 
teresred  in  the  European  Union,  it  suggests  that regional  integration  has  been  driven  primarily  by 
economic,  not geopolitical considerations--even in  the "least likely"  case.  (2)  For  those  interested in 
the role of ideas  in foreign  policy,  it suggests  that strong  interest groups  in a democracy  limit the im· 
pact of a  leader's geopolitical  ideology--even where  the executive has very  broad institutional autono-
my.  De  Gaulle was  a democratic statesman first  and an ideological  visionary second.  (3) For  those who 
employ qualitative case-study  methods,  it suggests  that even a  broad, representative sample of second-
ary  sources does  not create a firm  basis  for  causal  inference.  For political scientists,  as  for  historians, 
there  is  in many  cases  no reliable alternative to  primary-source  research. 
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Over two thousand books and articles in over forty-five languages have been devoted to the life 
of General Charles de Gaulle. 
1 Thousands more treat his policies within the context of European 
integration, postwar Western defense, or French foreign policy. Yet in at least one respect, these 
studies are remarkably uniform. Almost without exception, they treat de Gaulle as the archetype of 
the  visionary  or  ideological  statesman.  He  was,  biographers  and  commentators  agree,  an 
"innovative leader'' driven by "high" politics rather than "low" politics, politico-military prestige 
and  security rather than economic welfare,  a  distinctive  geopolitical  worldview rather than the 
mundane concerns of  democratic governance. His term as French President from 1958 to 1969 is a 
study in the possibilities and limits of  visionary statecraft in the m~dem  era. 
2 
Nowhere, it is said, are de Gaulle's ideational motivations more clearly demonstrated than by 
the  striking  series  of French  actions  toward  the  European  Community  (EC)  taken  under  his 
presidency. Upon entering office in 1958, the General surprised observers by swiftly embracing the 
Treaty of Rome and working closely with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to accelerate its 
implementation.  This  involved  pressing  both  Adenauer  and  his  successor,  Ludwig  Erhard,  to 
institute the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 1960, de Gaulle proposed the Fouchet Plan, an 
intergovernmental arrangement for European foreign and economic policy coordination.  Between 
1958 and 1969 de Gaulle consistently opposed closer relations with Britain, first vetoing a free trade 
area (FT  A) in 1959, then calling off two years of negotiations over British entry in January 1963, 
1 This article draws on materials in  Andrew Moravcsik., The Choice for Europe: Social Pumose and State Power &om Messina to Maastridtt (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 1998). For criticism and comments. I am particularly indebted to Stanley Hol'finann, for whom disagreement is no barrier to 
dialogue.  I also thank Charles Cogan. Piers Ludlow. Alberta Sbragia. and Kip Wennerhmd for close readings of  the book chapter &om whidl this 
argument is drawn.  On the number of books devoted to de Gaulle, see Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: Freud! Sewrity Policv and the 
Gaullist Ler.acy (  Princaon: Princaon University Press. 1993  ), 203n. The one-decade compilation. Instit.ut Charles de Gaulle, Nouvelle bibli0!!J111)hie 
internationale sur Charles de Gaulle, 1980-1990 (Paris:  Pion,  1990) is almost four hundred pages long. This does not include general articles and 
materials on related subje<:ts Frendl foreign policy of  the period. 
2 This is evident &om the titles ofrecmt works. See Daniel J.  Mahoney, De Gaulle: Statesmanship. Grandeur. and Modern Demoaacy (Westport: 
Praeger. 1996); John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (New Yorlt:  Viking Press. 1970); Stanley Hoffinann, "De Gaulle as an Innovative 
Leader." in  Gabriel Sheffer, ed.,  Innovative Leaders in  International  Politics. (Albany:  State University of New York Press,  1993). 57-81; John 
Pinder, Europe apinst de Gaulle (London: Pall Mall, 1963 ); Maurice V  aissc, La grandeur: Politioue etranW du U!u!ral de Gaulle 1958-1969 (Paris: 
Fayard, 1998); Charles Williams. The Lasl Great Frendlman: A Life of General De Gaulle (London: LiUie,  Brown and Company, 1993); Serge 
Berstein. The Republic of De Gaulle, 1958-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1993); Lois Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks for Europe? 
The Vision of  Charles de Gaulle (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1977). and  rejecting British initiatives to begin them again in  1967; he then turned around as initiating 
discussions  over  British  cooperation  with  the  EC  in  1969,  which  swiftly  became  membership 
discussions under his close associate and Gaullist successor, Georges Pompidou. In July 1965, in an 
effort to alter the institutional structure of the EC, de Gaulle launched the "empty chair crisis"-a · 
six-month French boycott of  decision-making in Brussels. The crisis, which appeared to threaten the 
very existence of the EC, was resolved only with the "Luxembourg Compromise," which granted 
each  member  government  an  extra-legal  veto  over  any  EC  legislation  that  threatens  a  "vital 
interest." 
There is a great divergence of opinion on whether de Gaulle's policy was effective or not and 
whether it was suited to the objective circumstances or not; there is  next to none concerning  its 
causes. Without exception, participants like Jean Monnet, contemporary commentators like Miriam 
Camps, political scientists like Stanley Hoffinann and Ernst Haas, and  myriad policy analysts and 
biographers all  explain de Gaulle's actions by invoking his  geopolitical ideas.
3  All  agree that de 
Gaulle's primary goal throughout was the construction of an  autonomous European foreign  and 
military policy-an alternative to US efforts to strengthen NATO, create a "Multilateral Force," and 
forge  a  privileged  nuclear  connection  with  Britain.  De  Gaulle's  desire  to  reinforce  French 
"grandeur",  his  wartime  suspicion of the  "Anglo-Saxons,"  his  pursuit  of a  distinctive unilateral 
foreign policy backed by  nuclear weapons,  and  his  nationalist commitment to the preservation of 
sovereignty are credited with inspiring French cooperation with Germany at the expense of  Britain 
5 Widely cited works include those cited in footnote two. and Nora Bel oft; The General Says No: Britain's Exclusion from Europe (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 1963 ); Frederic Bozo, Deux strategies pour I  'Europe : De <nsulle, les Etats-Unis et 1' Alliance atlantique 1958-1969 (Paris: Pion: Fondation 
Charles de <nsulle, 1996); Charles Cogan. Cbarles de Glulle: A Brief  Biography with Docum121ts (Boston: Bedford Boob, 1995); Anton W.  DePorte, 
De  <nsulle's  Foreign  Policy.  1964-1966 {Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  1968);  Alfred  Grosser,  La  Politique  Extl!riere de  Ia  Ve 
Republique (Paris:  Editions du  Seuil,  1965);  Michael  Harrisoo.,  The ReluW!nt  Ally:  France and Atlantic Security (Bahimore:  Jolms  Hopkins 
University Press, 1981); Stanley Hoffmann, "De Glulle, Europe and the Atlantic Alliance," International ()ngmi13lion  18:1  (Winter 1964), 1-25; 
Stanley Hoffinann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of  the Natim State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus 95 (Summer 1966): 892-908; 
Stanley Hoffmann, "De Glulle's Foreign Policy: The Stage and the Play, the Power and the Glory," in Hoffmann, ed., Decline or R121ewal?  France 
since the I 930s (New York: Viking Press,  I 974), 283-331: Ghita lonescu, Leacknhip in an fndepepdent World (Boulder: Westview, 1991); fnstitut 
Charles de Gaulle. ed.  De Glulle 121  son siecle: Europe Vol.  5 (Paris: Dooumaltal.ion  fran~ise, 1992); Jean Lacouture,  De <nsulle 3  vols (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1984-1988) cited from English edition, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 194!1-1970 (New York: Norton, 1991 ); Jean T oucl!ard, Le pullisme: 
1940-1969 (Paris:  Editions du Seuil,  1978); Edward  Kolodziej,  Frendl  International  Policv  under De GauUe  and  Pompidou (Ithaca:  Cornell 
2 and the United States, as well as French opposition to the growth of supranational institutions in 
Europe. De Gaulle was a visionary  leader~ he stood above interest group politics and commercial 
concerns. For neo-functionalist integration theorists like Haas, as for their critics like Hoffmann, de 
Gaulle was a "dramatic political actor" who personified nationalist opposition to the technocratic -
focus  on  economics  espoused  by  Monnet.
4  "The  price  of milk",  Philip  Williams  and  Martin 
Harrison observe, '\vas the very phrase which de Gaulle once chose to sum up in  contemptuous 
dismissal the entire range of  mundane trivia which were beneath his attention."
5 
This essay proposes a revisionist reversal of  the conventional wisdom concerning de  Gaulle's 
European policy. The price of  wheat, not the political grandeur and military security of  France, was 
the national interest that drove  de  Gaulle's European policy.  De Gaulle's nuclear ambitions,  his 
criticism  of the  United  States,  his  policy  toward  the  developing  world,  and  his  schemes  for 
overcoming  the  East-West  divide  may  well  have  been  motivated  by  a  visionary  geopolitical 
ideology.  His  European  policy,  however,  was  motivated  by  the  same  goals  shared  by  postwar 
democratic  politicians  everywhere:  generation  of electoral  support  and  avoidance  of disruptive 
strikes and  protests through the  promotion  of economic welfare and,  above  all,  appeasement of 
powerful  sectoral producer groups.  Systematic analysis of the available primary evidence reveals 
conclusively  that  the  four  major  European decisions  listed  above-acceptance of the  Treaty of 
Rome and promotion of  the CAP, the Fouchet Plan, the veto of  British membership, and the empty 
chair crisis-directly promoted the narrow export interests of organized agriculture and industry in 
France or were decisively constrained by those interests. De Gaulle pursued preferential access to 
foreign  markets  for  agricultural  exporters  in  order to raise  prices  and  quell  opposition  to  the 
government  despite  his  own  very  strong  inclination,  reflected  in  continuous  conflict  over 
University  Press.  1974);  Philip  Cerny,  The Politics of Grandeur:  Ideolociaal  Aspeas of de  Gaulle's  Foreim  Policy  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1980). 
4 Emst B. Haas. ""The Uniting ofEurope" and the Uniting of  Latin Ameriaa" Journal of  Common Market Studies S:4 (June 1967): 315-344; 
3 agricultural policy, to resist the demands of  farmers for subsidies in the broader national interest of 
industrial modernization. De Gaulle's European policy was also, albeit secondarily, concerned with 
assuring export markets for large industrial producers.  For all  its rhetorical  flourish,  de  Gaulle's 
European policy differed hardly at all from those pursued by his Fourth Republic predecessors and  · 
his various successors, both Gaullist and non-Gaullist. 
This  conclusion flatly  contradicts the received wisdom.  In the entire  corpus  of work on  de 
Gaulle and his European policy, there is-to my knowledge-not a single scholarly book or article 
that accords  primary  importance  to  French  commercial  interests.  The  literature  can instead  be 
divided into two categories:  those that argue commercial concerns were decidedly secondary and 
those that argue they were entirely irrelevant.
6 Let me be clear from the start: This is not to say de 
Gaulle was unmoved by a particular intergovernmental vision of Europe, but where such concerns 
clashed  with  commercial  imperatives,  the  latter  invariably  prevailed.  I  am  not  asserting  that 
economic  interests motivated  de  Gaulle to the  exclusion of geopolitical  ideas  and  interests.  De 
Gaulle did hold  distinctive geopolitical ideas, which played an important, even dominant, role in 
French  foreign  policy  of this  period-particular  interrelated  policies  toward  nuclear  weapons, 
NATO, the third world, and the superpowers.  I am asserting that in de Gaulle's European policy, 
the  one area where major economic and  geopolitical  interests were directly  engaged, the role of 
economic  motivations  has  been greatly  underestimated.  By  any  reasonable  measure,  commercial 
considerations were far more important than the geopolitical concerns in determining French policy 
toward the EC in this period. 
While revising the received wisdom concerning one of  the great statesmen of  the 20th century is 
a worthwhile end in itself, this revision also suggests three more general conclusions about modem 
>Philip Williams. Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic (London: Archon Books, 1964), 342. 
4 world politics. These concern, respectively, the explanation of  European integration, theories about 
the role of ideas in  foreign  policy-making, and  the proper use of historical  and  social  scientific 
methods in case-study-based research on world politics. 
For those  concerned  with  explaining  European  integration,  this  analysis  suggests  that  the 
motivations  that  have  led  governments  to  promote  the  EC  are  more  commercial  and  less 
geopolitical than is commonly supposed.  It is commonplace to argue that the primary reason for 
postwar European integration was to prevent another Franco-German war, to balance against one or 
both of  the superpowers, or to realize the ideological goal of a European federation.  Opponents of 
integration are seen as pursuing different, but equally geopolitical, interests and ideologies. For a 
generation  de  Gaulle's  foreign  policy  was  held  up  further  as  definitive  demonstration  that 
integration was  primarily  about competing  geopolitical  interests and  ideas,  not commercial  and 
economic interests.
7 Hence this analysis is something of  a "crucial case, in Harry Eckstein •  s sense: 
If even  de  Gaulle  was  motivated  to  support  European  integration  primarily  by  commercial 
considerations, surely most other postwar European governments were as welL 
8 
Turning from  European integration to comparative foreign  policy  ore generally,  this analysis 
suggests that a modern  democracy  imposes  narrow  constraints  on the pursuit of an  ideological 
foreign  policy  at  the  expense  of domestic  socioeconomic  interests.  This  challenges  traditional 
diplomatic historians and foreign policy specialists, who see de Gaulle as an archetypal "great man" 
pursuing  ideological,  idiosyncratic,  individualistic  foreign  policy,  as  well  as  contemporary 
"constructivists" in IR theory, who would see de Gaulle as striving to realize an interpretation of 
6 For the former. see Vaisse, Grandeur, 163, 167, 175.613. Yet evEn  Vaisse argues that "for General de Gaulle, the economic success of  the Ew-ope of 
Six was not an end in itself." (175) 
For a review of  this literatw-e, see Moravcsik, Choice for Europe. Chapters One and lbree. 
8 Harry Eckstein. "Case Studies and Theory in Social Science," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of  Political Science Volume 7 
(Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-138. 
5 French  "identity."
9  Yet  even  the most  institutionally  insulated  and  electorally  powerful  among 
democratic politicians-in this regard, de Gaulle is once again something of a "crucial case"-find 
it nearly impossible to pursue idiosyncratic policies in certain areas. At the very least, a strong dose 
of commonsensical skepticism about ideational explanations for major foreign policy decisions is 
warranted.  In the context of de Gaulle's relative success in defining distinctive French policies 
toward  NATO,  the  Third  World,  and  the  superpowers,  the  failure  of de  Gaulle's "visionary" 
European policy, suggest that a democratic statesman can pursue diffuse ideological goals only as 
long as they do not challenge the interests of  powerful organized groups. 
For those, finally,  who seek to improve the application of qualitative methods in the study of 
world  politics,  this  analysis  suggests  the  decisive  importance  of  adherence  to  rigorous 
methodological standards, both historiographical and social scientific, when conducting qualitative 
or  case-study  research.  Much  has  been  written  recently  calling  for  more  intense  interchange 
between historians and political scientists. Yet there remains considerable confusion about what this 
really means, if anything, for concrete empirical research. 
10 This study demonstrates some practical 
implications of such exhortations for research design.  Only a combination of primary sources and 
objective, explicit, transparent standards of  judging evidence-in short, qualitative methods drawn 
from  both history and  social  science-can overcome the biases in  prior interpretations.  Without 
adherence  to  methodological  principles  drawn  from  both  political  science  (e.g.  explicit 
consideration of a full  range of alternative theories and hypotheses) and from  history (e.g. the use 
wherever possible of  hard primary evidence), both social scientists and historians are condemned to 
repeat the conventional wisdom, whether correct or,  as  in this case,  questionable.  Methodological 
choices are neither abstract nor incidental but essential to an accurate interpretation and explanation 
offoreign policy. 
9 Craig Parsons. "France and European b:ltegration: A Conmudivist Explanation,'' {Bedceley: Unpublished Paper, 1998). 
6 From historians, this study suggests, we must accept the need to rely on primary sources.  The 
case of de Gaulle suggests,  as Ian Lustick has recently argued, that it is  not good enough to rest 
one's analysis on selected secondary sources. In contrast to Lustick, however, this study challenges 
also his preferred alternative, namely to provide a representative sample of  the secondary literature. · 
This study shows that even the entire range of secondary sources-even when they number in the 
thousands-may well be, at the very least, biased and  perhaps uniformly wrong;  at best, one is 
condemned to repeat the existing consensus, whatever it is. In this regard, de Gaulle is something of 
a "crucial  case,"  since  it  is  hard to imagine a  scholarly  consensus  deeper-but, I  argue,  more 
erroneous-than the  one  behind  an  ideological  and  geopolitical  interpretation  of de  Gaulle's 
European policy.  Only a firm  grounding in primary sources, in this case some which heretofore 
have not received serious consideration by analysts of  French foreign policy, gives us the leverage 
required  to make  an  original  empirical  contribution  by  reversing  the  conventional  wisdom  of 
historians. 
11 
From political scientists, this study suggests, we must accept the discipline of social scientific 
methods-the statement of clear competing theories, the specification of explicit hypotheses, and 
objective presentation and balancing of  the evidence both for and against each explanation. Without 
being compelled to confront  and  present the existing evidence  for  alternative explanations,  it  is 
difficult  to  know  whether  analysts  have  simply  presented  the  evidence  and  interpretations  that 
supports preexisting conclusions. This is particularly important in the case of  de Gaulle, a statesman 
who expressed himself in a rich, allusive and often deliberately ambiguous rhetoric, and wielded an 
extraordinarily magnetic hold on those close to him.  This has tempted generations of  commentators, 
scholars and memoir-writers to read into his rhetoric what they want to hear, thereby-as we shall 
1°  For an overview wi1h citations. see "Symposium: History and Theory,"lntemational Sewrity 22:1 (Summer 1991). 
11 lan Lustick.. "History, HiSloriogJ<~pby and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem ofSeleaion Bias," American Political 
Science Review 90:3 (September 1996). 605-618. 
7 see in detail below-engaging in unparalleled acts of  selective, out of  context citation. One example 
must suffice:  De Gaulle's press conference of 14  January  1963,  at which the British veto was 
announced, is perhaps the most oft-cited source of  quotations to support the view that de Gaulle had 
fundamental  ideological and geopolitical objections to British membership.  We often read of de 
Gaulle's characterization of  Britain's "insular" character and ''very original habits and traditions," 
his concern about "a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence," and much more. 
What is never mentioned is that de Gaulle's comments were entirely and unambiguously dedicated 
to  a  discussion  of the political  economy  of Britain  and  the  United  States.  particularly  in  the 
agricultural sector. There is not a single mention of  NATO, the MLF, the "special relationship;' or 
any other geopolitical issue. In fact, the overwhelming majority of  explicit statements by de Gaulle 
on Europe are of  this kind; only a small minority-typically the vaguest, most indirect, most public 
allusions-mention geopolitical concerns. 
The remainder of  this essay proceeds as follows. The first section below presents two competing 
theoretical explanations of de Gaulle's European policy, one focused on geopolitical interests and 
ideas,  the other on commercial interests-and draws explicit hypotheses from  each.  The second 
section  employs  primary  data to  evaluate  these  two  sets  of hypotheses  across  the  four  major 
episodes of  Gaullist policy listed above. The third section draws more general empirical, theoretical, 
and methodological conclusions. 
I. DE GAULLE AND FRENCH VITAL INTERESTS: TWO EXPLANATIONS 
Broadly  speaking,  there  are  two  plausible  explanations of French  policy  toward  Europe 
under de  Gaulle,  a conventional  view  that  stresses  de  Gaulle's geopolitical  ideas  and  politico-
military concerns and a competing view that looks to the commercial interests of  important French 
producer groups. 
8 A. Geopolitical Interests and Ideas: "Une certaine idee de Ia France" 
"All my life," de Gaulle declares at the outset of  his celebrated memoirs, "I have had a certain . 
idea of France."
12 It is thus no surprise that interpretations of de Gaulle's European policy tend to 
center on the nature of  his distinctive geopolitical ideas. Although Gaullism was famously absolutist 
in symbolic expression and frustratingly pragmatic in tactical application, nearly all interpretations 
ofFrench foreign policy in this period assert that "de Gaulle's worldview .. .implied a very specific 
set  of rules  for  national  policy"  based  on three tenets:  nationalism,  independence  and  military 
power.
13 
The  most  distinctive  element  in  de  Gaulle's  political  ideology  was  nationalism.  De Gaulle 
believed in the unquestioned primacy of the modem nation-state as a political instrument for the 
effective  and  legitimate  pursuit  of  national  interests.  Nation-states  remained  the  primary 
protagonists of modem history in part because they  were the only truly effective actors in  world 
politics,  but  more  fundamentally  because they  were  the  most  legitimate  actors.  The  legitimate 
purposes of nation-states vary greatly:  states are "very different from  one another", each with "its 
own soul, its own history, its own language and its own misfortunes, glories and ambitions."
14 De 
Gaulle sought to express the particular underlying purposes of modem France in terms of shared 
historical memories. He invoked French resentment about being defeated by the Axis and snubbed 
by the Allies during World War II. He voiced French frustration at the outcome of Suez. He termed 
the settlement in Algeria a contribution by France "once again in its history, to the enlightenment of 
12 Charles deGauUe. Memoires deGuaTe: I'  Appel Vol. 1 {Paris: Plm, 1954), I. 
u Gordon. Certain, S.  Similar summaries can be found in tbe works cited in foomates 2-3 above. I do nat mean "ideology" in tbe sense commonly 
employed in French polemics for or against Marxism. namely a teleological view of class conflict, but as a  coherent world-view of international 
relations. For a discussion oftbe definitions and role of ideas in world politics, see Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds. Ideas and Foreim 
Policy: Beliefs. Institutions. and Political Otange (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
14 Gordon, Certain, 10, 
9 the universe." He was prone to transhistorical generalities, as when he observed that "over the past 
800 years [France's] greatest hereditary enemy was not Germany, but England."
15 
For de Gaulle, it followed that each state should pursue an independent policy in order to "seek 
its rightful  place in the world."
16 France's rightful place in  the world,  de Gaulle argued,  was to 
realize  its distinctive heritage of prestige as  a great power-her "grandeur." he termed  it.
17 The 
primary objective of de Gaulle's grand strategy was thus to augment France's role as a "principal 
player" on the world scene; one historian concludes, 'lhe paramount goals of France were in the 
psychological  domain-in the areas  of independence,  rank,  prestige. "
18  This required,  in  tum, a 
measure of  independence and autonomy. 
There is  considerable disagreement about the extent to which these goals were pragmatic or 
ideational.  De  Gaulle  may  have viewed  grandeur  and  autonomy  simply  as  instruments  for  the 
prudent  realization  of conventional  geopolitical  goals.  Internationally,  a  measure  of power and 
prestige  permitted  the  exercise  of  political  influence;  domestically,  it  provided  symbolic 
legitimation for a greater sense of  national unity and a shared commitment to common interests. De 
Gaulle's also seems to have sought to renew the pride,  patriotism and unity of the French for its 
own sake-a goal that also, it should not be forgotten, garnered him strong electoral support among 
French voters and provided a justification for an extraordinary transfer of  political power away from 
parliament toward the executive. Perhaps, some speculate, de Gaulle's obsession with rank in the 
1
'  Alain PeyTefttte. C'etait de Gaulle Vol. 1 (Paris: Fayard, 1994) 153; Hoffmann, "De Gaulle," 1-2, 16-19; Gordon, Certain, 10-ll; Cogan, Charles de 
Gaulle. 140: Vaisse, Grandeur, 23-24. 
16 Harrison_ Reluctant Ally. 49. 
17 Gordon, Certain, 9ff. Vaisse, Grandeur, 24-25. 
18 Charles de Gaulle. Ldtres, N~es  it  Camits (Paris: Pion.  I 980ft), IV/170; Charles G. Cogan, Oldest Allies, Guarded Frimds: The United States and 
France since 1940 (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 145. 
10 world system stemmed from the experience of Anglo...American slights during World War IT-not 
the least the failure to extend timely recognition to his provisional government. 
19 
To the primacy of the nation-state and the pursuit of French grandeur and  independence,  de 
Gaulle added a Realist faith  in  military force as  a decisive means to project national  power and 
influence. De Gaulle apparently believed in a hierarchy of issues, with traditional politico-military 
issues ("high politics," one of de  Gaulle's leading interpreters-called them) at the top.  "National 
defense," he declared, "is the primary raison d'etre of  the state.':o2o He supported a strong Western 
position in Cuba and Berlin.  He believed nuclear weapons and  classical  diplomacy would make 
France a power to be reckoned with and remained contemptuous of  efforts to replace military force 
with  schemes  to  project  international  power  through  economic  interdependence  or  strong 
international  institutions.  "It had  been  obvious  since  1944,"  one  leading  analyst  writes,  "that 
General de Gaulle regarded the prime purpose of statecraft as enabling the state to count in world 
affairs and to have the means to defend itself in the ruthless struggle that nations wage against each 
other."
21  Military dependence begets political dependence. 
This  tripartite  worldview-nationalism,  grandeur,  military  force-is said  to  have  had  three 
implications for  France's European policy.  First,  de Gaulle is  said to have judged policies, even 
economic  policies  within  international  institutions  like  the  EC,  not  by  their  direct  economic 
benefits,  but by  their ability to promote  French  great  power status as  embodied  in  its  national 
independence,  military  prowess,  and  diplomatic  prestige-in  short,  French  grandeur.  In  the 
language  of international  relations,  de  Gaulle judged a foreign  economic  policy  not  on its  own 
terms, but according to the "security externalities" it generated. In European policy, "what really 
19 For a persuasive case. see Cogan, Oldest Allies. 19-53. 123-126: Gordon. Catain, 15-17. On the power of  the executive, see Charles de Gaulle, Le 
fil de r epee (Paris: Berger-Levrauh, 1932). In a unique. if speculative. reading of  de Gaulle·s intentions, Philip Cerny (Politics of  Grandeur) offers a 
"Bonapartisf' interpretation of  the policy of"gnmdeur" as a tool designed primarily to bolster domestic political support for strong domestic action. 
20 Vaisse, Grandeur. 44, also 24. 
11 mattered for de Gaulle was not economics but the construction of  a political Europe.'>2
2 Geopolitical 
interpretations sometimes concede that economic benefits were also  a secondary motivation,  but 
even such interpretations often treat economic welfare benefits as  an indirect means to augment 
French military power and political prestige, not as an end in itself 
Second,  de  Gaulle is  said to have  placed great weight  on an  independent European  foreign 
policy under the leadership of France, particularly in the area of national  defense,  as  a means to 
balance  the  superpowers  and  control  Germany.  To  be  sure,  this  was  not  a  purely  ideational 
preference, as is evident from the fact that it was neither de Gaulle's optimal nor even his second-
best policy. He would have preferred to dismember Germany, a policy he advocated immediately 
following  World War II,  or,  failing  that,  he  may  well  have  favored  a  nuclear triumvirate  with 
Britain and the US.  Only after Anglo-American rejection of plans to dismember Germany and, a 
decade later, their dismissal of  de Gaulle's September 1958 proposal for nuclear cooperation, did he 
tum  definitively  to the  five  other  EC  governments  and,  finally,  to  Germany.
23  Whatever  the 
combination of ideas  and  interests,  the result  was  an  obsession with the  recognition of French 
equality  in  foreign policy and  staunch opposition to  efforts to transform Europe "into a gigantic 
Atlantic Community ... dependent on  [and] run by America."
24 This position was sometimes linked 
to the vision of  a Europe stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals." More immediately, the primary 
goal  was  to establish  French  nuclear  hegemony  and  institutional  prerogatives  among  continental 
European countries. This is said to have driven de Gaulle's interest in European integration.
25 
:t Bentein, Republic of  de Gaulle, 153, also 154-155. 
:o Bentein. Republic. 171. also 170-172. Also Vafsse. Gmndeur, 25-26. 34-52. On ·•security externalities" more generally, see Joame Gowa, Allies. 
Adversaries and International Trade (PrinCEton:  PrinCEton  University Press, 1994). Gowa argues that security externalities are most important in a 
bipolar world order like that governing postwar Europe. 
23 Vaisse. Grandeur, 46, also 26, 35-40. Charles Cogan (Personal Communication) argues that the  tripartite initiative was simply a ploy. 
24 De Gaulle's Press Confercnceof14 January 1963, cited in Edmond Jouve, Le General de Gaulle a Ia construct.ion de l'Europe (1940-1966)  Vol.  2 
(Paris: Librairie General de Droit et de Jurispruda~ce, 1967), :Z83-:Z86. 
25 Co~  Oldest Alli~ 128-31 and 01aptcr Six, passim. Jouve, Gfio~  347-348, 352-358, 372-373, 381. 
12 Third,  de  Gaulle adopted an  extremely  skeptical  attitude toward  any  effort to  impose  even 
modest  constraints  on  state  autonomy  through  international  organizations.  He  was  openly 
contemptuous of  plans for the dissolution of  the nation-state in a supranational polity. He opposed 
the European Defense Community (EDC) and Euratom. as well as canceling secret Franco-German · 
cooperation on nuclear weapons. He began distancing France from NATO, a process culminating in 
withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. He often spoke of the debate over 
European integration in the 1960s as a battle between two "visions". of  Europe: the "utopian myths 
[of] supranational power'' on one side and a '
1confederation" in which no sovereign state could be 
"exposed to the possibility of  being overruled on any economic matter  ... and therefore in social and 
sometimes  political  matters
11  on  the  other.
26  Monnet,  Walter  Hallstein  and  other  convinced 
federalists of  the period saw the issue in the same light, even if  their normative evaluation was the 
opposite.  De Gaulle therefore rejected outright the pooling and  delegation  of sovereignty in the 
form  of QMV or Commission autonomy,  preferring to view the Treaty of Rome as  simply "an 
improved treaty of commerce. ,m A crisis over the general nature of the EC and in particular its 
supranational institutions, he subsequently maintained, was 
11SOoner or later inevitable11  because of 
"certain basic errors and ambiguities in the treaties on economic union ofthe Six.
1128 
While de  Gaulle's geopolitical  views seem to provide a convincing account of his European 
strategy, before moving on it is important to note that the link between a Gaullist geopolitical vision 
and French policy is more considerably more problematic than most commentators concede, for two 
basic reasons. 
16 Menil Who. 151. 154; Olarles de Gaulle. Memoirs of  Hope: Renewal and Endeavor(New York: Simon and Schust«, 1971}, 182ft 234; Record of 
Conversation wi1h Macmillan, 2 June 1962 (-);Gordon, Certain. 12-13; Vaisse, Grandeur, 37-39; (-). 
F  Jacques Leprdte. Une Clef pour l'Eurwe (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1994 ),  188. 
28 Menil Who,  150. 
13 First, while the General may have been motivated by distinctive geopolitical interests and ideas, 
he  was  also tactically  quite flexible.  Among  de Gaulle's maxims was:  "Audacity in words  and 
prudence in  actions."
29  Of the French government's surprising acceptance of the EEC  in  1958, 
Raymond  Aron observed that de  Gaulle  "had the intelligence to renounce his conceptions when 
they were overtaken by events. "
30 Hoffinann observes that "it is the combination of  inflexibility on 
fundamentals  and  pragmatism on tactics that made  his style of leadership so  predictable and  so 
unpredictable  at  the  same  time.'.31  Any  definitive  interpretation  of de  Gaulle's actions  is  thus 
hampered by the fact that it can be explained .either as the direct realization of his vision or as a 
tactical departure necessary to protect the core of that vision.  The Gaullist position on European 
integration  was  in  fact  extraordinarily  malleable,  varying  over time.  De  Gaulle  and  Gaullists 
supported dismemberment of  Germany and an "Atlantic Community" in the late 1940s, advocated a 
"federal" Europe until around 1951, criticized proposals for the ECSC and EDC and a confederal 
Europe in the early-1950s, remained relatively silent on European economic integration from 1952 
to  1958,  proposed  a  US-UK-France  triumvirate  excluding  Germany  in  1958,  pressed  for  the 
implementation of the Treaty of Rome  in  1958,  advocated  European political  cooperation from 
1960 to  1962,  supported  a close  bilateral Franco-German relationship  after  1962,  and  turned to 
Great Britain in the late 1960s. President Jacques Chirac's much commented support for Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) in the 1990s is hardly unexpected. 
32 
Second,  efforts to evaluate whether there really  is  a  link  between Gaullist ideas and  French 
policy  is  hampered by  the tendency  of some analysts to construe anything that advances "French 
interests" as consistent with the promotion of  French "grandeur." Some argue that de Gaulle sought 
19 Cogan. Oldest Allies. 17. 
30 Raymond Aron. Memoires: SO ans de reflexion politique (Paris: Julliard, 1983), 254. Also de Merul, Who. 76. 
31  Hoffmann. ·'De Gaulle as Innovative Leader,~ 71. 
32 The complex evolution is traced in dWiil in Jouve, General. I/1-86, 177-181, passim; Gordon, Cmain; Andrew  Knapp, Gaullism since de Gaulle 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994)  .. 
14 modernization only in order to increase augment the independence and grandeur of  France on the 
world stage. In order for France to be a great power, it needed a strong economy-a view for which 
de Gaulle's memoirs offer some modest support. In this reading, the pursuit of  electoral success, the 
promotion of material prosperity, or even the subsidization of  backward sectors of  the economy are · 
consistent with the Gaullist vision, because they are in some sense preconditions for an active French 
world role.  This sort of all-inclusive definition of  "grandeur," however, renders any claim about a 
distinctively Gaullist world-view and foreign policy untestable, ahistorical and unimportant.  It is 
untestable because no observable implication could ever permit us to distinguish de Gaulle's pursuit 
of such a broad conception of  "grandeur" from an obsession with the sort of mundane commercial 
considerations he  professed to despise.  It is  ahistorical because de Gaulle's British and  German 
counterparts-and apparently also the General himself-seem not to have seen the issue this way; 
they all distinguished explicitly between geopolitical and commercial motivations.  Above all,  it is 
unimportant because it renders epiphenomenal the decades-long debate over de Gaulle's distinctive 
"vision" of Europe. By suggesting that any French statesman would have pursued similar goals, it 
limits  de  Gaulle's  distinctiveness  to his  tactics-skilful  management  of domestic  matters  and 
facility at diplomacy-a view that essentially concedes the argument I seek to advance here.  If  the 
promotion of  French grandeur through economic liberalization is indistinguishable from the pursuit 
of  producer group interests, that is, if even support for farmers-a group de Gaulle initially sought 
to liquidate in the national interest and for whose concerns about commodity prices he showed open 
contempt-is consistent with grandeur, then there remains little meaning to the notion of de Gaulle 
as a visionary ideological leader. 
To assess de Gaulle's motives, the notion of geopolitical ideology must be defined  precisely. 
Accordingly,  this  analysis  follows  the  great  majority  of  de  Gaulle's  contemporaries  and 
commentators by ascribing to him a fundamental motivation to expand French influence, assert an 
15 independent  position vis-a-vis  the  superpowers,  and  control Germany  by  forging  a  Continental 
politico-military  alliance  around  French  nuclear  primacy  and  global  prestige-all of which  he 
sought to do while neither compromising French military autonomy nor delegating sovereignty to 
supranational institutions. All this was mediated by General de Gaulle's distinctive vision of  French 
grandeur.  As Marisol Touraine argues about French foreign policy to this day:  ''France's position 
seems guided more by the concern for asserting what France is or should be than by any concern for 
reaching a given goal. "
33 In short, this essay is concerned with the narrower problem of  whether the 
proximate cause of de  Gaulle's policy  was  geopolitical  or economic.  This  is  the  question  that 
contemporaries cared about most; it is the question German and British diplomats posed in their 
postmortems. It is also the decisive question for any analysis of  de Gaulle's individual influence as 
a thinker and a statesman. 
B. French Commercial Interests: "An Algeria on our own SoH" 
Analyses of  de Gaulle's foreign policy based on geopolitical interest and ideology often ignore 
the  prominence  in  Gaullist  rhetoric  of a  second  major  strand,  namely  the  overriding  need  for 
economic  renewal-the "transformation"  of France?
4  Two  policies  of economic  renewal  had 
particular  implications  for  French  foreign  policy:  industrial  and  agricultural  modernization. 
Economic modernization was not just a state-led move to promote French industry and agriculture 
from  above;  it  was  also  a response  to  pressures  and  constraints  imposed by  deeply  entrenched 
French domestic economic interest groups-backed by  their power to strike,  disrupt, invest, and 
vote.  The  desire  for  economic  modernization  and  pressure  from  commercial  interests,  I  argue 
31 Marisol Touraine. "Le  repnis~tation de l'adversaire dans  Ia  politique exterieure fran93ise depuis 1981," Revue francaise de sci~ce  politigue 43 
(October 1993 ), 808. 
,. Williams and Harrison. Politics, 416. 
16 below, suggest a secondrequally plausible, prima faeie explanation for de Gaulle's support of EC 
membership, promotion of  the CAP, veto ofBritain and conduct of  the "empty chair" crisis. 
Economic theories of commercial policy point to patterns of competitive position of national 
producers in global  and  domestic  markets  as the  primary  determinant  of sectoral  and  national 
preferences  across  openness  and  protection  of the  domestic  economy.
3
'  In  this  view,  new 
opportunities for  profitable international trade driven  by expanding international  markets  create 
incentives  for  reciprocal  and  sometimes  unilateral  trade liberalization.  These  opportunities  are 
supported most strongly  by producers with international  competitive advantages and tend to be 
viewed more skeptically by less competitive producers. The postwar period saw an extremely rapid 
expansion in trade among developed countries-an expansion that predated serious efforts at global 
or regional trade liberalization and subsumed even European countries that did not participate in 
regional trade liberalization. This trade was, moreover, largely intra-industry trade in manufactures, 
that is, two-way trade within industrial sectors. Rather than displacing sectoral producers entirely, 
intra-industry  this  tends  to  expand  trade  through  specialization  within  sectors  rather  than 
displacement of entire sectors. France was particularly competitive within Europe, but not globally 
in bulk agricultural producers (grain, sugar, beef); its industry developed swiftly in the 1950s and 
1960s, but remained only moderately competitive vis-a-vis Germany, Britain, or the US. This would 
lead us to predict that farmers would be the strongest interest group in favor of  trade liberalization, 
with industry lukewarm; both groups, particularly farmers,  would prefer regional to global trade 
I  iberalization. 
In France during the 1950s and  1960s, the steadiest and most powerful interest group pressure 
for  European integration  came  from  farmers.  In  France  agriculture comprised  a  higher share of 
1~ The literature is enormous. For an introductory summary. see Robert 0. Keohane and Helen  V.  Milner, eds.  Internationalization and Domestic 
Politi;;:s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996  ); for an application to the EC. see Moravcsik, Choice for Europe. 
17 employment (25%) than in any other of  the Six except Italy. French farmers were competitive on 
world markets in only a few  capital-intensive commodities,  such as  quality  wines  and  specialty 
gourmet  products,  but  they  produced  predominantly  land-intensive  agricultural  commodities, 
notably grain, sugar, wine, and dairy and beef products.  Subsidies, in the form of price supports, 
were  essential  to their  prosperity,  and  they  wielded  sufficient  electoral  power to impose  their 
preferences for support prices. on governments of any party.  By the mid-1950s, as in  most other 
West  European  countries,  French  farm  groups  imposed  a  de  facto  veto  over the  selection  of 
Agficulture  Ministers  and  had  forced  constant  increases  in  agricultural  subsidies.  The  Third 
Modernization  Plan  (1957-1961)  committed  the  French  government  to  support  20%  annual 
increases in agricultural production, with wheat, sugar, milk and meat particularly favored, due to 
the domination of  agricultural interest groups by wealthy, efficient farmers of  Northwest France and 
the Paris basin. Yet subsidies and modernization only exacerbated pressures on farmers.  Surpluses 
soared  as  France's  enormous  reserve  of previously  underutilized  land  was  brought  into  more 
intensive  production.  Wheat production  increased  over 800%,  sugar and  wine  over 300%  each, 
creating a need for even larger government-funded stockpiles and export subsidies. 
36  The  policy 
was manifestly unsustainable. 
Farmers  and  politicians  alike  understood  that  the  only  enduring  solution  was  a  preferential 
European trade agreement. French exports, in particular those of wheat and  sugar, would displace 
less costly world-market imports in  neighboring markets.  France, farm leaders stated,  '~ould thus 
be assured, in a community which grants a preferential exchange treatment to its member states, that 
;
6 The evidence is summarized in Moravcsilt, Choice for Europe. See also Carol Levy Balassa, Orpnized lndusby in Fnmce and the European 
Common Market: Interest Group Attiludes and Behavior (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD: unpublished dissertation, 1978), 450; Edelgard 
Mahant. French and German Attitudes to the Negotiations about the European Eoonomic Community. 1955-1965 (University of  ~Aldan: 
Unpublished dissertation, 1969), 219-220; Alan S. Milward, The F..urooean Rescue of  the Natioo-State (London: Routledge, 1993), 246ft; Pierre 
Barral Les Agrariens frans;ais de Maine a  Pisani (Paris, Librairie Almand Colin, 1968), 325-327; Hanns Peter Mu&h, Fra1c:h Agriculture and the 
Political integration of Western Europe: Toward "an Ever Closer Union ofthe European Peoples" (Leyden: Sijthoft 1970), 19-51, 88, I 13. The 
f<lfced resignation ofPfimlin's successor, Paul Antia-, in the early 1950s and de Gaulle's failed attack on agricultural subsidies in the late 1950s are 
two examples of  the domestic power of  agricultural interests.  See Milward, Rescue, 247-248. 
18 it would be able to increase, without risks, its production in the certainty of seeing-it-absorbed."P
7 
Within Europe, only British and German imports were sufficiently large to have a significant impact 
on French domestic prices. Hence French farmers had actively pressed for agricultural integration 
with one of these two countries--this pressure began well before the Schuman Plan. When in the · 
mid-1950s Britain clearly  signaled  its lack of interest in  such an arrangement,  French  farmers 
redoubled efforts to interest Germany. Farm groups were sufficiently influential that, one decision-
maker noted, "any French government was obliged to defend a common agricultural policy." In the 
Treaty  of Rome negotiations,  French ratification  without  adequate  agricultural  provisions  was 
considered  difficult,  perhaps  impossible.  Alone  among  interest  groups,  farmers  telegraphed  all 
French parliamentarians on the eve of  the Treaty vote to request their support?
8 
By 1958, when de Gaulle entered office, agricultural surpluses had reached the point of  crisis-
the importance of  which de Gaulle weighed above all other domestic issues. The first instinct of  de 
Gaulle  and  Prime  Minister  Debr6-who  both  viewed  agriculture  as  a  backward  sector  the 
promotion  of which  was  not  in  the  national  interest-was to  impose  "unvarnished  economic 
liberalism," cutting agricultural subsidies to dampen surpluses and push farmers out of agriculture. 
Opposition from farmers,  sometimes violent, swiftly stymied such efforts and de Gaulle reversed 
course.  A  different  solution  was  required.  By the  early  1960s,  farmers,  an  important  electoral 
constituency for Gaullists and other center-right parties in France, were again growing restless, as 
the  government  tried  to  limit  increases  in  government  subsidies.  Intermittent  riots  rocked  the 
country.
39  At a key Cabinet meeting,  de  Gaulle called the stabilization of agriculture the "most 
"' Muth. Frendt Agriculture, 88. 
Jll Mahant frendt and German Attitudes, 1260: 134, 135-153, 168ff; Balassa, Organized Industry in Frang; 104. 
39 Williams and Harrison. Politics, 340, also 174-176. 339-346; Alain Pe)Tefitte, C'etait de Gaulle Vol. 2 (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 356-374. De Gaulle 
and his ministers gave up the purely liberal approadl. With a strong exe<.:UI.ive  of the Fifth Republic, they were able to dampen prince ina-eases 
somewhat but  n~  mougb to resolve the problem by forcing rapid strua.untl adjustmt:nt on the land. 
19 important problem" facing France after the Algerian civil war. "If [agriculture] is not resolved," he 
concluded, "we will have another Algeria on our own soil. "
40 
De Gaulle came to the same realization that farmers  had  reached  a decade  before:  the only 
enduring solution was to export surpluses within a preferential and externally protected European 
market. Without this, de Gaulle predicted, continued unilateral subsidization would cripple French 
finances  and  undermine  the  French  balance  of payments.  With  Britain  uninterested,  the  only 
solution, farm leaders had already concluded by 1955, was to concede higher agricultural prices, a 
sine qua non for Germany, in exchange for preferential access to the German market. Such a deal 
was  possible,  de  Gaulle  later  observed,  because  for  Germany,  prices  were  primary  and  the 
maintenance of cheap imports secondary, while for France, export markets were a necessity and 
prices secondary. 
41 
A second  economic reason for de  Gaulle  to support the EC  was to promote and  modernize 
French industry through export-led expansion. "It is absurd," de Gaulle stated in 1965, "to be a sick 
40 Peyrefitte, C'etait. U302. Most Frasch archives for this period, including de Gaulle's personal materials, remain inaccessible. The analysis in this 
sed.ion  rests heavily, therefoce,  on  the memoirs of Alain  Peyrefitte, oral histocy projeds, leaked documents,  diplomatic interactions with  <Xher 
governments, and reconstrud.ion of  the precise sequence of events. Peyrefttte's memoir is the most critical source. Peyrefltte, unlike, say, Pisani or 
ever Debre. was de Gaulle's chief  assistant in this area and was coosistently involved in the innc:nnost deliberations.  His rising role under de Gaulle, 
from MP to pn:ss spokesman to minister, suggests that he had the General's trust. His role as preas spokesmlm lends plausibility to his consistent 
claim to have received direa instructions from de Gaulle on what to say and what not to say to the public. He was de Gaulle's chief staff assistant in 
this area and one of  only two people (the other being the prime minister) permitted to take notes at de Gaulle's Cabinet meetings, from which he cites 
verbatim.  Historians Georges Soutou and Gerard Bossuat, who has seen some of  the archival material in  question, and Charles Cogan. who has 
wmed with public materials, report that the mat&lrials they have seen do not contradid. Peyrefitte's account. No materials I have uncovered call the 
analysis into question. Peyrefltte, a clsssical Gaullist and. unlike Prate, not particularly involved in  economic issues, appears to have no particular 
interest in exaggerating the economic roots of de Gaulle's actions.  No materials I have uncovered call Peyrefitte's account into question;  indeed, 
Peyrefitte's account is corroborated by his strategy document, leaked and reprinted in the mid-1960s, and by his contemporary articles in Le monde. 
(See Jouve, Gmenll I/CITE) Peyrefitte's account is also supported by Prate, then a ministerial official, was in less favorable a position to judge, does 
not base the analysis oo citations from contemporary materials, and more presents speculative conclusions. While Prate does assert at one point assert 
that ·-politics"' was primary in  de Gaulle's decision to vao the UK, he gives significant weigjlt to industrial and agricultural interests; no faW!al 
information in his book cootradias m  economic interpretation.  Cf. Alain Prate, Les batailles economigues du General de Gaulle (Paris: Ploo, 1978), 
64. Far sketchier and more speculative, by contrast, are memoirs by two old comrades of de Gaulle's. Michel DebrC, Entretiens avec le general de 
Gaulle.  1961-1969 (Paris:  Albin Michel, 1993), 69-70, does not take a  firm position on the issue. Edpr Pisani <Le  general indivis (Paris:  Albin 
Michel.  1974)..  77-82. 89·90, 102-105. generally 85-113) presents a  speculative interpretation of  the "profound realities" of de Gaulle's thought, 
messing de Gaulle's vision of Europe's geopolitical and his commitment to Franco-German relations. He repeatedly insists that his aoalysis is not 
based on notes, records or faas, but on his own spiritual and emotional Sytq)atby with his "great patron's" public md private uttennces. It is clear 
that he was not in the inner circle of  deliberations, given his uncritical acceptance of  the itnpQrtance of  Nassau in triggering the veto of Britain-
which. as we shall see below, is now clearly be false-and the fad. that be was not fUlly informed of  the impcnding veto, perhaps in part because of 
his pro-European sentiments. Yet. as we shall see in more detail below, when the concrete faas about negotiations reported by Pisani tend not to 
support his speculative attribution of  geopolitical motivations. but an econocnic explanation. 
41 
•• Peyrefitte. C'dait, 1/67, 302, U/266; de Gaulle. Memoirs, 158-159, 180-185; Jouve, General, IU3S9-360, 364-365, 492-498; Balassa, Orpnlzed, 
393; Michel Debre. Trois r¢Rubliques pour une France: Agjr.  Vol. 2 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), 432-434; F.  Roy Willis, France, Germany and the 
New Europe, 1945-1967 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,  1968), 287ff. 
20 country behind tariffs and barriers.'' His ·"resolution to realize the Common Market", which had 
been "nothing more than a piece of  paper," he wrote later, was aimed at "creating the international 
competition  ...  the lever that strengthens domestic firms. ':>4
2 Here, too, there was continuity in French 
policy. During the negotiation of  the Treaty, industry had viewed safeguards and .escape clauses, 
social harmonization and unanimity voting as  a way of offsetting the risks to domestic industry 
stemming from the overvaluation of  the franc. Despite arapidiincrease-in exports to Europe during 
the 1950s, even the strongest supporters of  the Treaty ofRome doubted.1111y gov.emment's ability to 
overcome business opposition to strict implementation of  tariff reductions. French labor costs were 
relatively high and  "until the French franc  has been given a more realistic value, there is  little 
chance of  assuaging fears of  foreign competition felt by French industry:"
43 
In accordance with their commercial interests, both farmers and industrialists strongly opposed 
any free trade area {FT A)  arrangement with Britain. For farmers, the reason was obvious and the 
opposition unequivocal.  Since the mid-19th century Britain had imported agricultural commodities 
at world market prices-by the mid-20th century most imports came from the Commonwealth-and 
had thereby reduced its farming population to by far the smallest percentage in Europe. Britain was 
therefore certain to block a strong agricultural policy; hence British membership would undermine 
the preferential purpose of  the customs union, which could be achieved only by linking industrial 
tariff liberalization  to  agricultural  trade.
44  To  be  sure,  farm  groups  had  initially  sought  an 
arrangement with Britain-richer than Germany with a larger market-but when British opposition 
became clear, the major peak agricultural interest group, the Federation Nationale des  Syndicats 
42 Alan Prate, Le batailles economigues du Gen!!nl de Gaulle (Paris: Pion  1978), 4!1.  Also Lacouture, De Gaulle. 212; Institut Charles de Gaulle, 
1958. La Fai!lite ou le tnira!:le.  Le plan de Gaulle-Rueff (Paris: Eoonomica, 1986), 126-130, 98-99, 137-138, 126-127, 183; Jouve, Genm!, WI9S; 
Raymond Poidevin, "De Gaulle et !'Europe eu 1958," in lnstitul, De Gaulle, V/79-87; Alain Peyrefitte, The Trouble with France (New York: New 
York Univenity Press. I 981 ), 39; Alain Prate, Les batailles economigues du General de GauUe (Paris: Pion, 1978), 64; Jacques Rueff, De l'aube au 
a¢peswle, Alltobiographie (Paris: Pion, 1977), 252-256: Ruefl; Combats pour l'ordre fmmcier (Paris, Pion, 1972), 458-464; L'annee politiaue 1959, 
pp. xiii-xv. 
41 Moravcsik., Cbojce for Europe. Chapter Two; Balassa, Ongmized, 93-94. 
44 
This judgematt was corra:t. This was indeed one of  the considerations mentioned by decision-makers who advoad.ed British entry into the EC. 
Moravcsik., Choice for Europe, Chapter Three. 
21 d'Exploitant Agricoles (FNSEA) reversed position, arguing for British exclusion.  There could be 
"no equivocation
11  in the demand, the FNSEA stated, that a preferential arrangement should protect 
French producers from world market pressures. Industrial opposition to a free trade area (FT  A) with 
Britain was initially equally strong but more qualified. One observer notes that in opposing an FT  A · 
the major industry group, the Conseil National du Patronat Franyais (CNPF), was "for the first time 
in its history ...  completely unanimous." CNPF studies predicted that many French industrial sectors 
would  come  under  severe  competitive  pressure  from  British  industry,  while  French  colonial 
producers would be excluded. Industrial opposition to British membership would soften only late in 
the mid-1960s, after the devaluation of  the franc and the modernization of French industry (while 
British industry stagnated) moderated the competitive threat.
45 
In sum, the political economic explanation treats de Gaulle's European policy as the reflection 
of  an underlying desire to promote French industrial and agricultural producer interests by locking 
Germany into a preferential customs union from which Britain (and the US) would be excluded. 
This had to be achieved, however, without opening France up too rapidly to industrial and, above 
all, agricultural competition from third-country producers. De Gaulle inherited this pro-agricultural, 
anti-British policy from the Fourth Republic.  For de  Gaulle,  as for his  predecessors, the ultimate 
goal of  the policy was to assuage powerful interest groups, garner electoral support, modernize the 
French economy, and prevent domestic disorder. 
·~ Robert J.  Lieber.  British  Politics and European Unity:  Parties. Elites and Pressure Groups (Berkeley:  University of California Press. 1970), 75; 
lnstitut Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle till son siecle: Moderniser Ia  France Vol 3 (Paris: Documentation fran~ise, 1992), 46-56; Raymond Bertrand, 
"The European Common Market Proposal," International Organization 10 (November 1956), 570; Mahant, Frenc:.b,  177-185; Willis, France,lSI-264; 
Erling Bjol La  France devant !'Europe.  La  Politigue Eurweame de Ia  IVe ROOubligue (Coptlllbageo: Munk.sgaanl,  1966), Annexe; Pierre Guillen, 
"Le MRP et !'union ciconomique de !'Europe, 1947-1950," in Serge Berstein, Jean-Marie Mayeur, and Pierre Milza, eds., Le MR.P et Ia  construction 
europeenne (Paris: Editions Corq~lexe, 1993), 142-144. 
22 C. Makiag the Test Explicit: Cases, Hypotheses aad Evidence 
We have seen that a plausible a priori case can be made that de Gaulle's European policy was 
motivated  either  by  commercial  interest  or by  geopolitical  interests  and  ideas.  Since  nearh 
everything  written  on  de  Gaulle  Stresses  geopolitics,  and  most  of this  engages  in  literary  or 
biographical explanation, we in fact know little about the relative explanatory power of  these two 
competing explanations. In the next section of  this paper, I assess the explanatory power of  the two 
explanations in accounting for de Gaulle~  s actions in.four episodes: the decision to remain in the EC 
and promote the CAP, advocacy of the F  ouchet Plan, the. vetoes of British membership, and the 
"empty chair'' crisis of  1965-66. What is the appropriate method:for structuring such case studies? 
Here it is necessary to make a clean break with the existing literature on de Gaulle. One reason, 
as  I shall demonstrate in  more detail below, for the one-sidedness of the existing literature on de 
Gaulle is that it rests primarily on speculative, even imaginative reconstructions grounded in public 
writings and speeches. This approach suffers from two weaknesses. 
The first weakness stems from reliance on public rhetoric and secondary sources, in this case 
primarily de Gaulle's own memoirs and speeches. Particularly when assessing hidden motivations 
and calculations, the quality of  data is critical. Absent access to confidential documents, John Lewis 
Gaddis and others have observed, the public record is  often incomplete or biased. 
46 The reason is 
clear. Politicians and even journalists often have only weak incentives, if  any, to reveal the full truth 
about their true motivations and calculations.  Falsehood, whether intentional or inadvertent, often 
costs them little.  Speculation or manipulation may often be politically or professionally profitable. 
Hence national decision-makers often express one position in  public and the opposite in private, 
even  many  years  after  the  events  in  question.  Journalists  often  repeat  the  justifications  of 
44 Jolm Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxfotd: Clarendon Press, 1997), viii, 295 (-). 
23 governments or the conventional wisdom of the moment without providing us  with any hints of 
assessing their reliability. 
47 
This is particularly dangerous practice in the case of  General de Gaulle, since, as we shall see in 
more detail, he and his associates treated at least some public justification as "deliberate deception." 
De Gaulle,  moreover,  centralized  foreign  policy  decision-making within  a  very  small  group  of 
presidential advisors, often leaving important ministers wholly ignorant of critical decisions. There 
is  thus  a  particularly  good  reason  to  believe  that  there  is  a  disjuncture  between  public  and 
confidential discourse and practices. The General was a ''theatrical" politician who, we shall see in 
more detail below, regularly misled the public, his own Cabinet and even his own Prime Minister. 
Even his statements in Cabinet meetings were "prudent" and guarded.
48 
In part this reflects the absence, until recently, of much direct primary evidence about internal 
decision-making in Gaullist France. It would be unfair, of  course, to criticize too harshly speculative 
analyses by those who lack access to recently published sources. 
49 Yet such is the fascination with 
de  Gaulle and the size of the literature about him  that there has been a remarkable tendency to 
entertain  lengthy  conjectures  about  his  motivations.  Due  in  large  part  to  the  brilliance  and 
incisiveness of some who  have  done  so-Raymond Aron,  Alfred  Grosser,  Jean  Lacouture,  and 
Stanley Hoffmann come to mind-there is  an exaggerated tendency,  compared to the diplomatic 
history  of any  other  modem  statesman,  to  cite  such  secondary  interpretations  as  if they  were 
grounded in objective evidence, even when more reliable primary sources have become available. 
Many analyses are based in whole or in part on such sources. 
"  :-.;ot  only is public misrepresmtation of motives an oft-employed political tactic. but many statesmen, coocemed about their place in history, are 
careful to cuhivate a specific public impression. This was. for example. Monnet's (substantially correct) intecpretation of de Gaulle. Bnmo Boltai, 
·•Jean Monnet Visto da Vicino."' LiMes l  (Summer 1991). 152. Analysts, depaJding on their professional comrnitmems, are tempted either to weigj!t 
equally all possible factors explaining a given decision. to privilege the most prominent justifications of important actors, or to select arbitrarily to 
support the author·  s point. Nooe is reliable. 
48 Peyrefllle, C'etait. IIn-8; Hoffmann, "De Gaulle's." 
·~ Very recent works have begun to offset the historical trend by placing geopolitical ideology in  a  broader context.  But none displaces it as the 
24 public record alone supports an-economic interpretation of  de Gaulle's European. po~-:-albeit n~ 
as  unambiguously  as confidential  sources.  Why have  -~naly.sts failed Jo acknowledge this?  The 
reaso!?; lies in  th~ second weakness of de Gaulle. s_pholarship,  namely_the !ende11cy  to_~Bi,age in 
imaginative biographical reconstruction ofthe General's life and policies. 
De Gaulle's extraordinary appeal-more books have been written about him  and his policies 
than all but a  handful of modem political figures-is essentially personal in nature.  Just as his 
magnetic  presence  attracted  associates of uncommon  personal  devotion,  his  extraordinary  saga 
attracts  commentators  with  literary  biographical,  literary,  even  philosophical  sensibilities-
especially in France, a country whose intelligentsia has long been celebrated for just these qualities. 
Thus nearly every interpretation of de Gaulle's personality and politics rests on the unquestioned 
premise that his foreign policy was governed by a unified personal and philosophical vision. Each 
analyst then seeks to reformulate de Gaulle's world-view in a way maximally consistent with his 
subsequent actions.  The major debate among those who study de Gaulle's foreign policy centers 
around the extent to which this vision was a rational adaptation to security concerns or a sui generis 
world view. None seriously entertains the possibility that the General's vision was incoherent in the 
sense that different aspects of his foreign policy responded to different imperatives. Instead, as we 
saw in  the case of the Fouchet Plan,  de Gaulle's biographers and commentators unquestioningly 
treat departures from his personal "vision" as isolated acts of  tactical expediency. 
This mode of  interpretation is suspect above all because of  its circularity: Nearly all biographers 
and analysts examine de Gaulle's overall policy-his views on World War II, nuclear weapons, the 
superpowers, the developing world, and NATO-then argue that the same considerations must lie 
behind his European policy, because the General would not have tolerated intellectual incoherence. 
primacy rn(jivatioo for de Gaulle's European policy. Vaisse, Grandeur; Cerny, Politi!:S. The only earlier exception is Lindberg. "Integration." 
25 Such reasoning is circular, for it assumes what it sets out to demonstrate,· namely that de Gaulle was 
indeed  motivated  by  an  integrated  vision-without  considering  alternative  interpretations  or 
evidence. It  requires little evidence of  specific motivations for decisions about the EC. 
These  weaknesses  in  the  existing  literary-biographical  approach  to  explaining  de  Gaulle's 
policies  suggests  that  an  objective  assessment  of the  General's  motivations,  not  to  mention  a 
historical  revision  of the  consensus  view  about  those  motivation,  requires  more  rigorous  and 
objective  historical  and  social  scientific  methods.  This  study  adheres  to three  methodological 
principles grounded in historical or social  scientific methods.  From historians it takes the use  of 
primary sources, from social scientists the use of  competing theories and explicit hypotheses. 
First and  most  obvious,  this  study  rests  on both more extensive  and  more  reliable  primary 
evidence  than  existing  studies  of de  Gaulle's European  policy.  By taking  advantage  of direct 
evidence of  confidential deliberations and decision processes, most of  it newly available, this study 
seeks to move beyond the public justifications of  politicians. 
50 An important element of  the case for 
the economic explanation is that empirical support becomes stronger as sources grow "harder", that 
is,  as one moves from ex post speculation and overt attempts to persuade public opinion to direct 
evidence of  considerations raised in confidential meetings. Finally, this study employs various types 
of  direct evidence, not just the rhetoric of decision-makers, but the timing of  decisions, the identity 
of those involved in  domestic  deliberations,  and  the  negotiating tactics and  trade-offs chosen.  In 
sum, I assign no weight to speculation, whether by participants or by secondary analyses, and less 
weight to public utterances than records of  confidential decision-making. 
Second, this  study evaluates competing theories.  The two  explanations considered here--one 
stressing commercial advantages and the other geopolitical interests and  ideas-are derived  from 
•n The most important source is Peyrefltle'  s memoir. See fu 40 above. Wherever possible, sources are  triangulated; independent corroboration for each 
piece of  data is sought. 
26 two  major  schools  .of international  relations  theory  that  seek  to  explain  the  motivations  for 
international  economic ·-cooperation.  One  school  stresses  the  management  of  economic 
interdependen<(e,  the  other "security externalities" from  cooperation.  By  forcing  the  analyst  to 
evaluate the evidence for each explanation explicitly, the reader is better protected against one-sided · 
interpretation. In presenting the data, therefore, I attempted to provide a representative sample of 
what is available. In citing documentary evidence of  motivations, I both present specific quotations, 
as do most studies, and, where relevant, provide both a description of  the context and an assessment 
of  the extent to which the entire class of  documents of  this type support the conclusion. In short, I 
seek to provide assurances against the widespread tendency, exemplified above, to cite de Gaulle's 
statements out of context.  Hence,  for  example,  this study illuminates  a critically  important fact 
ignored by all existing, more interpretive studies: Based on currently available records, a far greater 
number  of justifications for  France's European  policy  offered  by  de  Gaulle  and  his  ministers, 
whether public or confidential,  stress the realization of commercial interests,  especially those of 
farmers, than stress geopolitical interests. 
Third, this study employs explicit hypotheses,  that is,  explicit standards for  confirmation and 
disconfirmation. This reduces the ability of  the analyst to reinterpret data in an ad hoc way to favor 
a given hypothesis.  While the use of explicit hypotheses can never entirely eliminate interpretive 
ambiguity,  it  renders  interpretation  more  objective  and  transparent.  Literary  and  biographical 
analysis  undisciplined  by  any  systematic  guarantee  of unbiased  selection  of data  and  balanced 
interpretation  becomes  more  difficult.  It  is  more  difficult  to  reach  a  premature  and  biased 
conclusion and  it  is easier for others to challenge either the criterion or the interpretation.  In each 
case-and at the expense of lengthening the analysis-representative samples of both confirming 
and  disconfrrming  evidence  are  reported.  In  short,  interpretations  are  more  rigorous  and  more 
replicable. 
27 Accordingly,  the  analysis  in  the  next  section,  which  summarizes  the  analysis  found  in  a 
forthcoming book, relies exclusively on four types of data, each of  which bears on the accuracy of 
explicit competing hypotheses drawn from the two theories above. 
• Discourse - If  geopolitical motivations predominate, discourse among French decision-makers 
privilege  geopolitical  arguments  by  mentioning  them  more  often,  with  greater  emphasis  than 
economic ones.  If economic  motivations predominate, we should  observe the reverse.  To avoid 
inferring motivations from opportunistic, manipulative, or unconsidered statements, it is important 
wherever  possible  to  move  beyond  public · statements  by  government  officials  or  ex  post 
speculations, which (as we shall see in more detail below) are often incomplete if not disingenuous, 
and instead rely on confidential discussions between de Gaulle and his closest advisors, as well as 
interviews and  memoirs (by those without a clear incentive to dissemble) that reliably report the 
details of  confidential processes of  decision-making at the time. 
• Patterns of  Domestic Support and Decision-Making-If  geopolitical motivations predominate, 
we should  observe critical  pressure and  involvement by  broad  public  opinion,  the military,  and 
foreign ministries. If economic motivations predominate, we should observe critical pressure from 
producer groups, their partisan supporters, and economic officials. 
•  Timing  - If geopolitical  motivations  predominate,  policy  shifts  should  follow  maJor 
geopolitical  events  that  reveal  new  information  or  alter  preferences  concerning  the  security 
environment For example, we should observe a weakening of support for the EC in the transition 
from the Fourth to the Fifth Republics in  1958, closer relations with Germany after the rejection of 
the General's proposal for a US-UK-French nuclear triumvirate in 1958, French reactions to the US 
proposal for a Multi-Lateral Force, a downgrading of  European ambitions after the collapse of the 
Fouchet  Plan  negotiations,  and  heightened  hostility  toward  Britain  after  the  US-UK  Nassau 
28 agreement. If  economic motivations predominate, policy shifts should generally be correlated with 
shifts in competitiveness or domestic support, not geopolitical events. They should be more gradual 
or linked to major domestic economic reforms. We should, therefore, observe a rapid strengthening 
of French  support for  European tariff reductions  in  the  late  1950s,  slow  acceptance  of GATT  · 
industrial tariff reductions during the 1960s, but no underlying shift in policies toward agriculture 
until the CAP is fully secure. 
•  Resolution  of  Conflicts  among  Competing  Objectives  - If geopolitical  motivations 
predominate, clashes between geopolitical and economic imperatives tend to be resolved in favor of 
the  former.  De Gaulle  should  consistently  be  willing  to trade  economic  objectives  to achieve 
geopolitical objectives. Maintenance of  intergovernmental institutions and exclusion of  the "Anglo-
Saxons" should take precedence over commercial concerns. If  economic motivations predominate, 
we should observe the reverse. France should generally accept supranational institutions and British 
participation to achieve economic ends. 
ll. DE GAULLE AND EUROPE: EVALUATING THE ffiSTORICAL RECORD 
We have seen that there are two plausible explanations of de Gaulle's policies: a conventional 
geopolitical  view and  a  revisionist  economic  explanation.  The great  preponderance of evidence 
assembled below demonstrates that the latter were sufficient to explain French policy toward the EC 
and  predominated  where  the  two  came  into  conflict~ geopolitical  interests  and  ideas  remained 
secondary concerns. The public perception of French policy was often deliberately manipulated to 
serve commercial ends. De Gaulle planned years in advance and pursued a consistent policy. As we 
shall  see,  each of the major French decisions  from  the Fouchet Plan through the ''Empty Chair" 
29 Fouchet 
Plan  . 
DIRECT EVIDENCE 
(Bold evidence supports ~  econ~mic  explanati<m  .. Italicized evidence 
supports an explanation based on geopolitical interest or ideas.) 
Domestic Discourse  ·Domestic  · Timing  Negotiating 
Cleavages  Tactics 
(1) Nearly all direct references 
by de Gaulle and his associates 
to EC and CAP in internal 
deliberations and subsequent 
memoirs or interviews cite 
economic considerations. No 
confidential records mention 
geopolitics; memoirs treat it as 
secondary. 
(2) Strongest statements concern 
economics. CdG confidentially 
calls agriculture the "most 
important problem facing France 
save Algeria"; without a 
European solution there will be 
"an Algeria on French soil." 
(3) Gaullist rhetoric is initially 
generally anti·EC. 
(4) Record of 1958 reforms 
suggests economic motivations. 
( 1) Peyrefitte Memo of 1960, 
accepted by CdG, confidential 
discussions, and negotiating 
instructions treat the Fouchet 
Plan as "deliberate deception," 
an attempted "seduction" of 
federalists, and a disguise for 
French proposals of  a "British 
Europe without the British." 
(2) This "prudently audacious" 
plan delays frontal attack. 
'f  .._  ;, >!f.!''.  ~  ;~'  f ;J'J"'lt •  \  :; I  ,; l  {1  • 
·.r;,  ·~:·,r~  ~!.1tP~"r(:f"{; 
'_;  (  ,:'( r  "  \/Uft. 1/l'.'!it\ f'·t·!'l />F: 
f;'n·uttr_:i;  1/f.f; .p,_ 1;t;nr' 
'!·:··t'•:!intal .(.!Jt(/i ....  though 
economics is almost invariably 
treated in greater detail. 
(1) Fanners are 
clearly a critical 
constituency. 
French 
government 
spends much time 
and effort trying 
to placate them. 
(2) Gaullists 
initially seek to 
cut agricultural 
subsidies, but 
reverse policy. 
(3) Gaullists are 
initially hostile to 
EC (on 
ideological 
grounds) but 
reverse course in 
1958. 
(1) CdG 
successfully 
secures support 
from  Monnet and 
federalists for 
several critical 
years until  1962. 
(1) CdG maintains 
the policies of  his 
Fourth Republic 
predecessors. 
(2) CdG appears 
to commit to EC 
before US·UK 
response to 
triumvirate 
proposal or 
meeting with 
Adenauer. 
(1) Tougher 
second version of 
Fouchet is drafted 
in CdG's hand 
within 48 hours 
after key CAP 
agreement. 
(2) Geopolitical 
events that reveal 
new 
information-
including the 
MLF, revisions to 
the Elysee 
Treaty-have no 
apparent effect on 
French policy. 
( 1) CdG opposes ideology 
and institutions in the Rome 
Treaty but accepts them. 
(2) CdG threatens 
withdrawal from EC and 
geopolitical policies to 
achieve the CAP. but never 
links withdrawal or makes 
economic threats to 
geopolitical goals. 
(3) French government 
promotes supranational 
institutions to secure CAP. 
(4) 1958 economic reforms 
include much more than 
trade liberalization, 
suggesting that they were 
not designed simply to 
fulfill Treaty obligations. 
(I  ) CdG refuses to negotiate 
seriously on Fouchet Plan-
offering no economic 
concessions and toughening 
his demands over time. 
Geopolitical explanations 
that make him out to be 
irrational or uninformed are 
implausible. 
1::1 Cd( r cn/lS/S!CIIfh· >CC!:' 
Francn-( icrmon lnrC/gii 
rnl:c  r ( nnrcraflfl!1 hetlrn.:n 
I 'Jf'  .~  ruu i i Wi5. ••  --"·•·~-·  "·~'  -- ~-- ---~-,~  ••• ,..  -·- ~  •••.  -'"  ·~r  .•  ""  ·~-- -:···-_·~·~~~~  ~~-~·~-""""'~ 
•  ••••  >#~-.  ~'_:.!~- r~-,~~-" ···~:  ~:~- __  -'·"~: ..  :.".c.~'"'~-~~~:,~  ..  :~~:··"--~~'~" .  --~~- "'  -,  ••- - --•  ~: ·. ·  __ ·  ~  -~  ~~:·  ~: '·,,_  .:.:~•"t·: :~::~~1 
.  ~  .  . 
_  .  .  .  DIRECf  EVIDEN~E.  __ 
(Bold evidenee supports an eeonoinie explana~oD.:7ta!icized  evidence 
· suppor~_an  eXplanation based on geo]iolitical interests or ideas.) 
( l) CdG' s own statements, including his 
memoirs, the l/14/63 press conference, 
and cabinet meetings, mention economic 
motivations exclusively and ex:Qlicitly, 
while ignoring geopolitics. 
(2) The factual reports of  all CdG's close  There is 
consistent  associates who speak out on the issue  agricultural and  (e.g. Couve, Peyrefitte, Debre, Pisani, 
Pompidou) privilege economic interests.  industrial 
opposition to 
British  d1 .i minonn· ut these assodares ! Pisuni. 
Prtlfl!l nonetheless spcculclfe thar  membership, 
though the  geopolitics was I he prime/IT molinuirm.  position of  French 
(4) CdG and Macmillan agree in 1962  industry softens 
summit meetings that agriculture is the  during the 1960s 
critical issue whereas geopolitical  after devaluation 
differences are modest or ambiguous.  and industrial 
development. 
(5) Internal German government study 
and Harold Wilson's information suggest 
economics predominant. Macmillan's 
views are mcertain. 
r  11 5.'ir:nitlcwli 
t'fL'C(IJI'Uf 
(1) CdG's few confidential statements  "I'Pm i m m umm  1g 
suggest concern about maintaining  ftll'/11('1'\  /11  1  Yf\5-
control over the CAP and GATT policy.  J()of>-which is 
consistent with 
,:, ,),,/}/,  tl[ ( 'j(; \  1/ti/t'/11,'111\  d/1£1  EITHER 
u/1fc'cl/rl!/1 <'111/c'L'l'/1  ~1'/JJ/lrJ/i,  /1.111<  I  explanation. 
, . '..; ..  t 'o/11/}}/1.1/riil 1'<'/'l'c'St'II/,J/IUI/ <1/'l'f 1;1, / 
(2) Thereafter 
~3  1  .-l  jt)f15 JLI\'nt·h r,_:n,·ernlll,_'nl  ~tllcil  CdG reverses 
...  unt. ;ud.._,,  /lhJ/  }· r,_  lh i1  I!Uilu;.'!li  :Jill r.._·,,,  course, shifts 
Hi/i !/(1/ fl1' ,'r1/Jif1/'fl/l/lll',i h1'/llt  ,,.;,,.,/11/t ,,  from a 
/l'tli/.1/1/11// {II 1/J(//fl/'1/\' \'01//.'t!  '"referendwn" to 
an "election" 
r..f;  j•;.'lTt'!f!l~  r._•T~,.;J'\  Jn f'U,\l/,''.: hJ {lllr\11!/  campaign, turns 
of "nuflf!lhll .. /11/,.,.,.,,,  <II!,U/111/  much power over 
·,kc/orui  .. /llh'l\'1},\  to politicians, and 
moves to reclaim 
farm support 
(l) Fourth 
Republic 
governments are 
just as skeptical of 
FT A and British 
membership. 
(2) 1962 decision 
to veto was taken 
before Nassau. 
(3) French veto 
comes soon after 
elections, as 
predicted by 
British 
ambassador. 
(4) CdG and 
Pompidou reverse 
policy in 1969· 
1970--as CdG 
had predicted 
since 1963. 
Pompidou expects 
CdG's support. 
(I) CdG foresees 
crisis in 1960-l, 
so it cannot result 
from disillusion 
with Fouchet! 
Elysee Treaty. 
(2) CdG restrains 
his negotiators 
and waits five 
years until the 
CAP is essentially 
in place before 
provoking the 
crisis. 
Negotiating 
Tacties 
(I) De Gaulle 
stresses 
agriculture and 
seeks to avoid 
discussion of(and 
later suppresses 
evidence of 
agreement on) 
geopolitical 
issues. 
(2) Failure of 
political mion 
negotiations, 
admitted by CdG 
before veto, does 
not alter French 
policy. 
(1) CdG neither 
threatens exit nor 
fully suspends 
participation 
during crisis-in 
contrast to 
stronger threats 
over CAP. 
(2) CdG settles 
for very few of  his 
original 
demands-those 
tacitly shared by 
other countries. 
The EC is not 
greatly altered. 
Four years later he 
still seeks reform. Crisis were explicitly foreseen in  1960, then executed as ·planned.  These data are summarized  in 
Tables One and Two. 
A.  Accepting the Customs Union and Advocating the CAP: "France is only as European as 
she is Agricultural" 
A direct clash between geopolitical ideas and  commercial interest arose immediately upon de 
Gaulle's entry into office in 1958. The Gaullist party, having concluded that much less was at stake 
geopolitically than in the debate over the EDC four years before, had split its parliamentary votes on 
ratification of the Treaty of  Rome in  1957.  Leading Gaullists like Michel Debre, de Gaulle's first 
Prime Minister, however, had called for renunciation or renegotiation on ideational grounds.  The 
General, though he himself had remained silent on this issue, was widely expected to do the same. 
In  an  internal  strategy  meeting  in  June  1958,  he  noted that  "if I had  negotiated  [the  Treaty],  I 
probably  would  have  done  it differently"-referring,  as  he  made  clear,  primarily  to the  lack  of 
guarantees for agriculture.
51  Within a few  months, however, de Gaulle had opted to support swift 
and  full  implementation of the  Treaty's provisions for  a customs  union.  De Gaulle  supported a 
common external trade policy with respect to GATT and European non-members and  accelerated 
reductions in  industrial tariffs.  Above  all,  he  pressed  for rapid  and  full  implementation of open-
ended  provisions  for  a Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP),  a  preferential  arrangement  for  free 
trade  in  agricultural  commodities  within  Europe  with  common  support  prices,  financing 
mechanisms,  levies  on  third-country  imports  and  export  subsidies.  How  is  this  surprising 
turnaround to be explained? 
'
1 
( ..  )  He restated this in  a  1965  interview. Jouve, ~  n, 364.  De Gaulle did cut off Franco-German bilateral atomic CO<.!peration,  but the 
Euratom clauses of  the Treaty of  Rome pertaining to military matters had already hem gutted by the Fourth  Rq~ublic government that negotiated the 
Treaty, headed by Guy Mollet. 
30 The conventional view is  that de Gaulle reversed course because he  sought to construct  an 
arrangement  for  European political  cooperation  independent  of the United  States.  Yet there is 
almost no direct evidence that either the General's turnaround in 1958 or his subsequent policy of 
support for the customs union and the CAP reflected a distinctive geopolitical vision. The bulk of 
the evidence-the critical portions or which are summarized in Table One-suggests instead that he 
reestablished continuity in France's European policy despite Gaullist ideology. 
Let us consider first de Gaulle's own expression of  his motivations during this period confirms 
the primacy of  economic interests.  As we saw ·above, de Gaulle believed agriculture, the European 
issue discussed most extensively in his cabinet during this period, to be the major problem facing 
France next to Algeria. The economic sources of  his support for the common market are reflected in 
his  memoirs  and  interviews.  Participants  in  decisions  in  1958  report  that  de  Gaulle  saw 
liberalization  as  consistent  with  his  broader  econotruc  reform  plan  (the  "Plan  Rueff')  for 
devaluation of the franc  to increase competitiveness,  combined with fiscal  austerity.  This  was a 
thorough-going  reform  economic  policy,  or  which  only  one  element,  trade  liberalization,  was 
connected  with  the  common  market. 
52  The  General's  closest  advisor  reports  that  his  "major 
argument  for  the  CAP  was  that  French  industry  could  not  afford  to  subsidize  our agriculture 
alone. "
53  For de  Gaulle,  another recalls,  a  preferential  arrangement  in  agriculture,  opposed  by 
Germany,  was  the "primary  precondition"  for  de  Gaulle  to  accept  the  customs  union.
54  Such 
concerns punctuate Cabinet meetings, whereas there is no record of  even a single clear mention of  a 
connection between agriculture and geopolitical goals:  ''The dominant subject," says de Gaulle, "is 
~~de Gaulle, Memoirs. 159, 178-179, 182-183; Jouve, ~  IL 195, 364; Peyrefrtte, C'l!lait, I-II; Lacouture, De  Gaull~ 224-225; Alessandro Silj, 
Europe's Political Puzzle:  A Study of  the Foudut Negotiations and the 1963 Veto (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univenity Caner for Intematiooal 
Aflairs Occasional  Paper No.  17,  1967),  114-116;  Pierre Maillard,  De Gaulle et I'  Allemagne: le reve inadleve (Paris:  Ploo,  1990),  142; Jebb, 
Memoirs. 310; Institute Charles de Gaulle,  1958. 82; Gladwyn Jebb, The Memoirs of  Lord Gladwyn (Londoo: Weybrigbt and Talley,  197%), 310, 
reports a January 1957 convenatioo with de Gaulle in whim be opposed Moonct's Europe but accepted economic raticoalization. 
H Pe:.Tefll1e. C' eta it. IY267. 
~  Prate, Bataitles. 5  2ff. 
31 agriculture."
55 Even in de Gaulle's own memoirs-surely a place where he would elaborate a global 
vision-the discussion of the 1958 decision mentions only economic considerations, in particular 
the modernization of  French industry and agriculture.  5
6 
The only countervailing evidence comes from more general discussions of  French geopolitical 
goals in  de Gaulle's memoirs and, though surprisingly rarely,  in Cabinet meetings.  As  we have 
seen, such claims create a plausible prima facie argument for the importance of  geopolitical factors, 
yet nothing links these objectives directly to economic integration. These discussions do not stress 
the  need  for  European  political  cooperation vis-a-vis  the  superpowers.  Whereas  de  Gaulle  did 
criticize  American  "hegemony"  in  various  speeches,  sometimes  mentioning  politico-military 
concerns,  his  explicit  references  to the  potential  for  Anglo-American  influence  in  the  EC  in 
confidential meetings refer explicitly to US and UK trade policy, not their military policy. The trade 
conflict between the US  and  Europe,  he  observed  after voicing one set of criticisms of US-UK 
influence in Europe, was solely concerned with farm  commodities. "It boils down to this," he says 
in one cabinet session, "we are both agricultural producers. "
57 
The timing of de Gaulle's decisions further support an economic interpretation of his  motives 
for remaining in the EU.  We can reject the widespread notion that de Gaulle remained in the EC 
because he sought foreign policy and defense cooperation with Germany to create a European "third 
force" after the failure of  French proposals for a nuclear triumvirate. De Gaulle informally assured 
Adenauer that he would respect the Treaty ofRome before he sent the September 1958 memo to the 
~' Peyrefltte. C'  etail.. W23l-232, also 274. 
'"de Gaulle. MemoU. ofHope.135, 159, 171, 173.174-180. 
''  Peyrefltte. C'etait, W26S, also 237,264-266, 271-274; Jouve, General, ll/283-288. 
32 US and UK proposing a nuclear triumvirate and well before he· knew of  their rejection.  The later 
events could not have caused the former. 
53 
Similarly, the sudden salience of Franco-British disputes in the late 1950s and early 1960s is 
often  presented  as  evidence  of de  Gaulle's  particular  antipathy  to the  Anglo-Americans,  as  if 
opposition  to  British  membership  was  a  Gaullist  innovation.  Yet  there  was  in  fact  near  total 
continuity between the Fourth and Fifth Republics; the General's much-maligned Fourth Republic 
predecessors  were just  as  skeptical as  he  concerning  cooperation  with  Britain,  particularly  in 
agriculture.  In the closing days of the Fourth· Republic,  French officials were already preparing 
plans to obstruct FT  A negotiations with Britain. The parliamentary committee that considered the 
FT  A in the closing days of  the Fourth Republic had concluded that the "concrete objections to a free 
trade area,"  including declining French influence over EC economic policy, "outweighed the less 
well-defined  political  gains"  from  cooperation  with  the  British. 
59  In  the  French  Assemblee 
Nationale, a contemporary observer noted, one could not "find a single deputy to support" a FTA 
with Britain.
60 
The  major  difference  between  de  Gaulle  and  his  Fourth  Republic  predecessors  lay  not  in 
strategy, but in tactics.  De Gaulle's stronger domestic position permitted him to devalue the franc 
and impose budgetary austerity. This led to a swift reversal of the position of French business, not 
because he imposed his geopolitical  vision on business, but because he gave industry what it had 
wanted all along but thought impossible: a real devaluation of  the franc of  over 20%. Thus while the 
General's aims-economic reform and  trade liberalization--did not differ from  those of many of 
his  predecessors, the power of Fifth  Republic  presidency and  unified  support of the center-right 
"de  Gaulle. Memoirs, 177-178; Interview with Baron Snoy e1.  d'Oppuezs, July 1937 (Interview 27,38: EC Ardtives Fiesole}, 14; Vaisse, Grandeur, 
55-56. Frederic Bozo further undermines the geopolitical explanation when he concludes that de Gaulle did not decide definitively for a geopolitical 
move toward Germany, rather than the US and UK, Wltil 1962. Fredenc Bozo. Deux Strategies pour l'Eurooe: de Gaulle. les Etats-Unis et I' Alliance 
Allantigue 1958-1969 (Paris: Pion. 1996), CITE. 
'
9 
(-) See also Lindberg. Political Dvnami~  118-125; Jebb, Memoirs. 292ff. 
33 permitted him  to realize them  more  effectively.  By 1959, industry,  in the  midst of a European 
export boom. had become an enthusiastic supporter of accelerated tariff and quota removal.  With 
both industry and  agriculture  now  supportive of a customs  union,  but both opposed  (the  latter 
implacably) to an FTA arrangement with Britain, de Gaulle supported an acceleration of industrial  · 
tariff removal  among EEC members  and,  with the failure  of his  initial  efforts to impose  liberal 
reforms on farmers,  retreated to the agricultural policy pursued by his predecessors:  he  sought to 
establish a "small European" preferential agricultural arrangement.  Over the next eight years,  de 
Gaulle's major priority with respect to the EC  remained  the  elaboration and  implementation of 
vague treaty clauses on agriculture.
61 
Turning  from  confidential  statements  and  timing  to  negotiating  strategy,  we  find  further 
evidence of  the predominance of  economic interests. The major obstacle to the creation of  the CAP 
was the German government,  which  sought to protect relatively uncompetitive German farmers. 
The seriousness with which de  Gaulle took the CAP  is  evidenced by the tactical flexibility with 
which he sought to overcome German opposition. Three aspects of  the CAP negotiations during the 
1960s  demonstrate,  as  the  economic  explanation  predicts,  de  Gaulle's  willingness  to  make 
geopolitical  concessions  and  run  geopolitical  risks  in  order  to  prevail  achieve  commercial 
objectives. 
First were his  continuous threats to  exit the  EC  if Germany  refused to approve the CAP.  De 
Gaulle was unequivocal:  "There will  be  no  Common Market without a CAP," he  declared to his 
Cabinet, "France is  only as European as  she  is  agricultural."
62 The "core difficulty" with Franco-
German  relations,  he  argued,  was  agriculture.
63  To induce Germany to open its  highly protected 
.., (••) 
61  Moravcsik.. Oloice for Europe, <llapta- Three. 
62 P  f)Tefine. C' tbit. II/26 5, also lll. 
63 Pe:-Tefllle, C'  .bit, Ill245. 
34 domestic agricultural markets and to abrogate bilateral arrangements with third countries, de Gaulle 
linked  German  approval  of CAP  to French  approval  for  GATT  negotiations  and  EC anti-trust 
policy.  In  a deliberate  effort  to  pressure the weak Erhard  government,  de  Gaulle  went further, 
threatening dozens of  times in public and private to destroy the EC. When doubts were raised within -
de Gaulle's Cabinet concerning the credibility of such threats;  de Gaulle responded that France 
could now compete within an industrial FT A, within w.hich most of  the expansion up to 1962 took 
place, and would be free of the supranational baggage of the EC.  De Gaulle believed that only a 
"total error" would lead France to actually have to make good on such threats.  Some within the 
government doubted their credibility, due to the costs to French industrial exports, but de Gaulle 
responds that various FTA or GATT alternatives could then be exploited.  The geopolitical costs 
appear not to have been considered.
64 No mention is made of  the geopolitical costs of  destroying the 
EC. While de Gaulle repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the EC-to trigger an "explosion," as 
he  put  it  in  cabinet  sessions-if the  Germans  rejected  the  CAP,  we  never  observe  de  Gaulle 
threatening to liquidate the EC  or compromise  on  agriculture  in  order to secure foreign  policy 
cooperation-as the geopolitical explanation would predict. 
65 
Second was de  Gaulle's willingness to link  CAP to costly other geopolitical threats,  yet  his 
consistent  unwillingness  to  risk  or  trade  economic  interests  to  achieve  geopolitical  goals.  In 
pressing  for  the CAP,  de  Gaulle threatened  a radical  reconsideration of French political-military 
policy,  including  suspension  or denunciation  of the  Franco-German  Treaty  of 1963;  a  shift  of 
alliances  away  from  Germany  toward  the  Soviet  Union;  withdrawal  of French  troops  from 
Germany;  as  well  as the abandonment of political  cooperation within the EC,  as  we just saw.
66 
When his closest advisor asked him what France would do if Germany offered satisfaction on the 
64 Peyrefllle. C'c!lait. 111265-267, also 219-221, 224-225. 231-232, 249, 251-254. 263-267. 271-274, 282. "For the General," PeyrefJtte recalls, "the 
Treaty was nat a substitute for the Common Market, but a means to advance it." Peyrefitte, C'c!lait, W232. 
6:1  De Gaulle. Memoirs. 186, also 182. 185-188. For numerous 1hreats. see Moravcslk. Otoice for Europe, Chapter Three. 
35 CAP  but  simultaneously  joined  the  MLF-from de  Gaulle's  perspective,  the  worst  possible 
geopolitical  outcome, but an  attractive economic prospect-the General replied:  ''We would not 
trigger an explosion.  We find  the Multilateral Force unpleasant, but they are free  to  do  as  they 
please.'..67 If  de  Gaulle were supporting integration for geopolitical  reasons,  it would have  made 
little sense for him to place geopolitical advantages at risk to benefit farmers.  To be sure, de Gaulle 
did occasionally hint at a potential shift in alliances toward Russia if  Germany failed to implement 
the Franco-German treaty, yet he soon dropped this rhetoric; by contrast he consistently threatened 
radical geopolitical shifts if  the CAP was not implemented. In any case, the threat was never carried 
Third was the willingness of  de Gaulle and his Gaullist successor, Georges Pompidou, to accept 
substantial  international  constraints  French  sovereignty-anathema to  the  Gaullist  ideology-to 
achieve agricultural cooperation.  As  the Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de  Murville noted,  his 
government became "the guardian of  the Treaties" when it suited its interests.
69 In the early 1960s, it 
was  above  all  Gaullist  France  that  insisted  on  moving  beyond  long-term  bilateral  agricultural 
contracts,  a  minimalist  form  of agricultural  cooperation  initially  favored  by  France  as  less 
"supranational," to a more centralized CAP system managed and financed in large part by Brussels-
based  officials.  This  eventually  involved  an  entire  system  of value-added  taxes  centralized  in 
Brussels-in short, supranational taxation. France favored this delegation of  sovereignty in order to 
lock in the CAP against persistent efforts by agricultural officials in Germany (which opposed such 
concentrations  of  institutional  power  in  Brussels)  to  frustrate  everyday  implementation. 
Accordingly  it  was  Germany,  rhetorically  more  "federalist,"  that  most  strongly  opposed  such 
.. Peyrefltte. C"etait.ll/231-237, 245-261. 
67 Peyrefltte. C" etait. ll/269. De Gaulle notes that France would thm be free to seek altemlllive alliances in the East. 
68 Peyrefttle. C'e!ail, 11!222·221 
69 Couve de Murville cited in Lqlr~,  Un clef. 118-119. 
36 financial  centralization.  Pompidou,  as  we  see  in  more  detail  below,  demanded  a  permanent 
centralized financing arrangement to lock in the CAP as a quid pro quo for raising the French veto 
on British membership in 1969-not least to undermine any future efforts by Britain to undermine 
the CAP.
70  In short, neither France nor Germany act as their geopolitical interests and ideology 
predict; both consistently pursue the interests of  powerful domestic producers. 
B. The Fouchet Plan: A "Deliberate Deception" 
We have seen that de Gaulle's decisions to remain within the EC and to promote the CAP were 
dictated primarily by economic interests. Yet most maintain in any case that the EC was secondary 
to de Gaulle's more distinctive European foreign policy initiatives, above all the proposal generally 
taken to be the centerpiece of  his geopolitical vision for Europe: the Fouchet Plan. First proposed in 
1961  by  De  Gaulle's  Minister  Christian  Fouchet,  the  plan  called  for  a  new  international 
organization without supranational institutions to coordinate European foreign and economic policy. 
In its  initial form,  it was a narrow arrangement limited to foreign policy-a modest arrangement 
alongside the EC. Then in January 1962 the proposal was suddenly revised by de Gaulle himself in 
a  much more intransigent, "nationalist" form.  The General cut acknowledgments of the Atlantic 
Alliance  and the  Treaty of Rome,  proposed  to  supplant  the  EC  in economic  affairs,  removed 
references to an  "indissoluble union",  reduced any  supranational powers, and  purged a "revision 
clause"  permitting  the  institution  to  be  brought  back  within  the  EC.  Thereafter  he  remained 
intransigent, making a few changes but never returning to a draft as forthcoming as his original. The 
10 
On the coofli<.t..  Vaisse. Grandtm, 554-SS6. Precisely the converse occurred in external tariff and competition policy. After France blocked efforts 
to develop  a flexible  negotiating position  in  the GAIT, Gfnnany  sought  greater  Commission  administrative autonomy  from  the  111  and  113 
committees. This suggests more broadly that European governments, regardless of  their ideology, delegated powen to European institutions when 
they sougJ!t to lock in substantive gains. For a test of  this argument aaoss five EC decisions, see Moravcsik. Choice for Europe. 
37 negotiations swiftly collapsed, leaving only the possibility for modest bilateral cooperation between 
France and Germany. 
71 
The  curious  history  of the  Fouchet Plan  has  confounded  historians.  Particularly  difficult  to 
explain are de  Gaulle's apparently  self-defeating tactics.  In most negotiations, parties begin with 
extreme positions, then compromise toward a median, whereas the historical record reveals not a 
single  occasion  in  which  de  Gaulle  credibly  signaled  willingness  to  make  even  the  smallest 
compromise in order to secure agreement on the Fouchet Plan work.  And  if he truly  sought an 
independent  European  foreign  policy,  why  did  he  not  link  the  Fouchet  Plan to  even  the  most 
marginal  quid  pro  quo  in  other  areas,  such  as  direct  elections  to  the  European  Parliament-in 
striking contrast, we have already seen, to far more flexible French diplomacy on economic issues? 
Why,  in the years following the abandonment of the Fouchet Plan,  did  he  reject proposals from 
advisors to resurrect it?
72 
To  explain  this  paradoxical  behavior,  those  who  treat  the  Fouchet  Plan  as  the  genuine 
centerpiece  of Gaullist  European  policy  are  forced  to  advance  speculative  conjectures  that 
contradict their own portrait of  the General as a master diplomat.  Some speculate that de Gaulle's 
intransigence  reflected  pressure  from  Prime  Minister Debre. 
73  Others  conjecture that  de  Gaulle 
suddenly  noted  details  in  the  first  Fouchet  Plan  he  had  previously  overlooked  or fell  prey to a 
miscommunication within the French bureaucracy.  Still others attribute the change to de Gaulle's 
"impetuous" personality or exceptional  sense of principle.
74  A French participant's description of 
71  This plan. developed by Soutou, Couve and ~ers. appears to have been desil!Jled to be at the extreme limit of what the ~er  five govemmatts 
might accept. Georges-Henri SOUlou, "Le ge:runl de Gaulle et le plan Fouchet." in Institute, De Gaulle Vol. 5,  136-137; Pierre Gerbet., "In Seard! of 
Political Union: The Fouchet Plan Negotiations (1960-62).." Roy Pryce. ed., The Dynamics of  European Union (London: Routledge, 1987), 121-122; 
Silj, Europe's, 15-16; Debre, Trois, 440. Jouve, Genenl W441-458. 
72 PeyTefrtte. C'tilait. W214-217. 
71 B«slein. Republic, '8..00. 
74 Soutou. "Genenl." 
38 the decision as an oversight is typical: ''The General ... could not resist the temptation to add two or 
three little touches that looked like nothing at the time."
7
' 
Such ad hoc explanations are neither supported by hard evidence nor remotely plausible given 
what we know about the conduct of foreign policy under de Gaulle.  Intervention by Debre this 
would  constitute  a  unique  demonstration  of ministerial  independence  by  a  man  with  neither 
significant political support (he was soon forced to resign) nor a reputation for particular intellectual 
creativity. Moreover, in contrast to the sometime role of  de Gaulle in domestic affairs, where details 
were often indeed left to ministers, the realm of foreign policy-making under de Gaulle was an 
extremely centralized "reserved domain" of  Presidential activity. Given the attention de Gaulle paid 
to foreign policy issues and the tight control over policy-making held by a select group of  advisors 
within the Elysee, is implausible that he would "overlook" a proposal that constituted the core of  his 
European  strategy  and,  moreover,  would  fundamentally  revise  French  foreign  policy  decision-
making.  In any case, if errors had occurred-the consequences were immediately apparent to de 
Gaulle's negotiators-they could  easily  have been reversed.
76  Records of policy-making  in  this 
period leave little doubt that de Gaulle took decisions without prior ministerial consultation and, in 
important cases like the British veto and the "empty chair" crisis, without subsequently informing 
his ministers until much later. His verbatim revisions of  the second Fouchet Plan are the rule, not 
the exception.  In short, any claim that de GauiJe placed primary importance on geopolitical goals 
like those embodied in the Fouchet Plan requires that one paint him as somehow irrational because 
impetuous, uninformed, or distracted. 
If we instead accept that de Gaulle was a master tactician and did not make elementary errors, 
then the assumption that the Fouchet Plan was primarily motivated by geopolitical ideas must be 
7
'  Lacouture, De Gaulle, 349. 
76 
For sud! coojectuTes. see Lacouture, De Gaulle, 349; Silj, ~  14-16; Soutou, "Gt2tcnl," who  bases his  analysis on  infonnatioo &om his 
39 called into question. A far simpler explanation of  French policy-one·  much more consistent, as we 
have seen, with de Gaulle's own statements-is simply that de Gaulle was not concerned primarily 
with geopolitical  ideas and  interests, but with French commercial  interests,  particularly those of 
farmers.  To be sure, de Gaulle would have preferred that political relations be conducted under an-
intergovernmental arrangement like the Fouchet Plan, but gave priority to the EC at least as long as 
the CAP remained incomplete.
77 From the start, de Gaulle considered it unlikely that others would 
accept the Fouchet Plan,  but considered  it  useful  in  any  case  as  a  cloak for  his  opposition to 
supranational  institutions behind a distinctive_ "European" vision while the CAP  was  still under 
negotiation. This, he hoped, would soften opposition to the CAP in Germany and elsewhere while 
strengthening domestic partisan support in France. 
Fortunately  we  need  not  speculate  about  which  explanation  is  correct;  hard  documentary 
evidence----critical  portions  of which  are  summarized  on  Table  One-strongly  supports  the 
commercial interpretation. De Gaulle did have a long-term strategic and tactical plan, which was set 
forth in a 1960 strategic document drafted by  his chief strategist and closest advisor on this issue, 
Alain Peyrefitte----first deputy, then press spokesman, and  then also minister-and in  de Gaulle's 
confidential instructions to negotiating and cabinet ministers.
78 The plan, followed to the letter over 
the subsequent six years, privileged economic, particularly agricultural,  interests over de Gaulle's 
ideological opposition to supranationalism or desire for joint foreign policy cooperation. 
The documentary evidence suggests, more specifically, that de Gaulle and Peyrefitte viewed the 
Fouchet  Plan  as  a  means  to  disguise  the  tension  between  France's  economic  interests  and  de 
Gaulle's opposition to supranational institutions. De Gaulle found  himself in (what Peyrefitte later 
termed)  a  "paradoxical"  and  vulnerable  diplomatic  position,  namely  he  supported  substantive 
father. 
-, Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle tt !'Europe (Paris: Tallandier. 199S), lOS. This is the way de Gaulle himself expressed it. Jouve, Gerunl, 367. 
40 cooperation-a  common  external  tariff  and  agricultural  policy-but : opposed  :supranational 
institutions. This tension as the central tactical problem facing the French government in the early 
1960s. If  de Gaulle's opposition to supranational institutions became too clear, he would lead other 
countries to side with Britain and endanger the delicate. ongoing negotiations about the.CAP. This 
diplomatic  situation  required  what  Peyrefitte,  tenned  a  "prudently  audacious"  strategy.  This 
extraordinary strategy, which hinted at all the major  developments ofthe EEC from 1960 through 
1966, was  set forth  in  confidential documents,  negotiating instructions,  and Cabinet discussions 
between 1959 and 1961. All subsequent descriptions of  internal deliberations by participants---'-even 
those who speculate that de Gaulle was motivated by geopolitics-are consistent with this plan. We 
know that de Gaulle immediately read and sought to implement the· plan. Peyrefitte was rewarded 
for his foreign policy advice with a remarkably rapid advance from an obscure position within the 
Assemblee Nationale to a ministry. 
79 
The  "prudently  audacious"  set  forth  in  Peyrefitte's  memo  and  de  Gaulle's  confidential 
instructions to his ministers rested on three imperatives. The first was to maintain forward progress 
in areas of  importance to it, notably agriculture, the French government must disguise its true goals 
of  undermining supranational institutions by striving "never to appear negative." This was required, 
Peyrefitte argued, to keep the negotiations moving forward and to avoid triggering counterdemands 
and  obstruction  from  its  allies  on  economic  issues.  (If agriculture  had  not  been  the dominant 
concern, de Gaulle could of course have challenged supranational institutions immediately.) Hence 
France must avoid conveying any inkling of  its desire to destroy EC institutions in pursuit of  its true 
71 De Gaulle turned to Peyrefllle for practical strategic counsel at other critical moments in his Presidency. E.g. Lacouture, De Gaulle. .514. 
79 Peyrefllle, C'etait, 11302. Peyrefltte's memoir is corroborated by documents and by Debre, who recalls that the review of  French policy was based 
not on ideology. but pure national interests: avoiding a free trade area without external tariffs, the role of  overseas territories; and the establishment of 
the CAP.  Debre, Trois, 11!4l2ff. See also Leprette, Un clef. lOSn; Peyrefllle's articles in Le monde (14. 15 and 17 SEptember 1960). For evidence that 
de Gaulle read and internalized the Peyrefitte memo, see Jouve. Gcruinl, 1172, 11/48.5-502. 
41 goal:  "a  British  Europe  without  the  British."
80  Any  hint  of de  Gaulle's  plan  to  destroy  EC 
institutions might place the French at a psychological disadvantage in ongoing CAP negotiations or 
lead  the  other  five  to  side  with  the  British.  France  should  instead  "seduce"  the  other  five 
governments away from  the EC  by proposing more  intergovernmental plans-this advice  being · 
written less than a year before the first draft of the Fouchet Plan.  At best, this may induce other 
governments to voluntarily renounce the EEC.  At least, it would create the illusion of a positive 
French policy toward Europe in order to assure continued forward motion.  Perhaps, the Peyrefitte 
memo cynically speculated, this policy might even persuade European federalists, who comprised a 
majority in many national parliaments, that "the President of the Republic had been 'converted' to 
their principles." For nearly two years, it had the intended effect on none other than Jean Monnet, 
who  supported de Gaulle's plans for foreign policy coordination until the latter's true intentions 
became clear. 
81 
The second "prudently audacious" imperative was to block British entry.  The  Britis~ as we 
shall see in more detail in the next section, were certain to block agreement on the CAP; hence it 
was imperative that France block their bid for membership. If  the French stalled and made demands 
in accession negotiations, de Gaulle calculated, British negotiators-tightly constrained at home by 
agricultural  and  Commonwealth  interests  in  the  Conservative  Party-would be  forced  either to 
withdraw or to bargain so intransigently that they would be blamed for a collapse of negotiations. 
The  Fouchet  Plan  would  place  even  greater  pressure  on Britain.  The  apparent  "deepening"  of 
""Peyrefitte. General. 498. also 489-496.  To appreciate the deception. compare Peyrefitte's arti<:les in Le Moode (14, 1.5, 16 and 17 Septemllfl' 1960), 
whicb  argue that  it would be "illogical to seek a  British  Europe without the British." (Jouve,  GeneraL  IJ/439-440).  Recall  also de Gaulle's 
<:ilara(!eristically ambiguous advi~  to Giscard: "Neva- invoke special interests in public. Talk only about the country's int«ests and have only ils 
im.crcss at heart.· Philippe Alexandre, The Duel: De Gaulle and Pompidou (Bmton: Hougblon Mifflin, 1972), Ill 
81  Jouve, General. U, 489-499, esp. II/498. Also Etienne Burin des Rozia-s, Retour aux sources. 1962 l'annee decisive (Paris: Pion, 1986), 51-53. 
42 integration, de Gaulle and his associates reasoned, might force the British to mistakenly "exclude 
themselves" from a superficially federalist, but actually more "British" arrangement.
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The third imperative was eventually, should the Fouchet Plan fail to induce institutional change, 
to  confront  France's  European  counterparts  directly.  France  would  threaten  radical  action-
including  withdrawal  from  Europe-if the  Treaty  were  not  revised  to  remove  supranational 
elements. One could not do this, however, until the EC implemented the CAP and blocked British 
'  l  ~  ~- '  .• 
entry.  Accordingly,  de Gaulle's confidential  negotiating guidelines to Debre in  September  1960, 
within a month  after Peyrefltte's memo, instructed li.im  not to challenge the EEC  overtly.  If the 
Fouchet Plan succeeded, the EEC would wither away; if it failed, France would confront the other 
five member governments and "deal directly" with EC institutions when the time was right. 
83 
De Gaulle pursued Peyrefitte's ''prudently audacious" plan to the letter for six years,  pressing 
forward  on  agriculture,  disguising  his  true  political  intentions  through  positive  proposals, 
discouraging and ultimately vetoing British entry,  and-but only  once an agricultural agreement 
was secure-confronting supranational institutions directly.  There is,  by  contrast, no documentary 
evidence to support the conjecture advanced first by Miriam Camps and subsequently by most other 
commentators that de Gaulle's "brutal" negotiating tactics in the Fouchet Plan negotiations, as well 
as  his repeated threats to withdraw from  the EC, resulted from  his  anger or disappointment over 
geopolitical developments. 
84 
De Gaulle's own statements during this period tended to stress primarily the need to realize the 
common  agricultural  policy  to  balance  industrial  trade  liberalization,  and  mentioned  political 
82 Jouve. Genenl. IL 4&9-499. esp. II/498. 
13 Jouve. Genenl, Il  4&9-499; Otarles de Gaulle, Ldtres. Notes d. Camas (Paris: Pion, 19&0),  398-399; Soutou, "Genenl," 126-7,  130; Soutou. 
"1961: le plan Foudtet." Espoir &7 (December 1992), 40-.5.5:  Menil. Who, 68; Susanne J.  Bodenheimer, Political Unioo: A Microcosm of European 
Politics (Leyden, Sijthoff: 1961), 77-&4. 
84  Camps misinterprd.s French statanents from Le Monde (Oiiober 22. 1965), cited in Miriam Camps, European Unification in the Sillties: From the 
V  d.o to the Crisis (New York.:  Magraw-Hill Books. 1966  ),  &7, 91. Also Menil, Who, 188. Throughout the 1960s de Gaulle offered the Germans no 
43 cooperation as a secondary task to be launched once agricultural issues were resolved. To be sure, 
de Gaulle spoke of  global tasks awaiting a politically unified Europe and occasionally hinted that 
economic cooperation might not persist if  it did not deepen toward political cooperation, but these 
allusions were more vague and less immediate than his explicit threats to withdraw from the EC if · 
the CAP was not realized. 
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The lack of  evidence for an interpretation of  de Gaulle's actions based on geopolitical ideas and 
interests is  clearest if we examine the timing of French policy shifts.  Commercial concern about 
agriculture immediately makes sense of  the timing and content apparently counterproductive French 
negotiating taGtics.  The second revision of the Fouchet Plan was drafted at a meeting among de 
Gaulle and  a  few  of his  ministers just four  hours after the decisive  agriculture  compromise of 
January  1962,  which  assured  that  the  CAP  would  move  forward.  By  setting  forth  a  more 
intransigent position, de Gaulle forced other governments to reject it, placing the public onus of  the 
collapse of the negotiations on them and preserving his "pro-European" image.  Later in  1962 de 
Gaulle began moving, as set forth in Peyrefitte's plan, to provoke a conflict with pro-Europeans in 
France by stating his anti-supranationalist views plainly-though he remained cautious until after 
the elections of  late 1962, the British veto, and the CAP agreements of 1964 and 1965.
86 Hence de 
Gaulle did  not provoke the "empty chair" crisis for nearly  five  years, until  the CAP was all  but 
complete. This timing is hard to explain unless we assume that de Gaulle placed the continuation of 
economic  negotiations  within  the  EC  over  immediate  pursuit  of geopolitical  goals  within  the 
Fouchet Plan, such as political union and the emasculation of  supranational institutions. 
more than "rewnciliation without equality": his "universalist nationalism" remained incompatible with any form of supranational cooperation, even in 
foreign policy.  Hoffmann, "De Gaulle's," 296-7; Hoffinann, "Obstinate," 388-389. 
"' Jouve, ~·  II!263·280. 
84 Berst.ein. Republic. 71-80; Williams and Hamson, Politics, 51 
44 Even more striking than the timing of  tactical moves, however, is the absolute consistency of  the 
''prudently  audacious"  French  policy  over this  period  despite  radical  geopolitical  swings-the 
proposal and  abandonment of the Fouchet Plan and President Kennedy's proposal and President 
Johnson's subsequent abandonment of a Multilateral Force, the US-UK Nassau Agreement of 1962 
(explored  in  more detail  below), the emasculation of the Franco-German Treaty, the  shift  from 
Adenauer to Erhard, the imposition of a pro-NATO  preamble on the Franco-German Treaty of 
1963,  and the blunt refusal  of the Erhard government  in Germany to discuss  any but the  most 
mundane of issues connected with political union. None of this diverted France from its pursuit of 
the CAP.  This stability,  like  de Gaulle's conduct of the Fouchet Plan  negotiations,  is  difficult, 
perhaps  impossible to explain from  a  geopolitical  perspective without a  long  series of ad  hoc, 
undocumented suppositions about de Gaulle's state of mind.  The modest increase in conflict in the 
period from  1962 to 1966--as predicted in Peyrefitte's memo-arose not because of geopolitical 
pressures, as many have argued, because the moment had come for difficult German concessions on 
agricultural prices and because,  having achieved  those concessions,  de Gaulle felt  better able to 
challenge supranational institutions. 
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Again, let me be clear. There is no denying that de Gaulle was motivated in part by geopolitical 
ideas,  in  particular  in  his  desire  to  tempt  Germany  further  away  from  an  Atlanticist  toward  a 
European  foreign  policy  arrangement.  He  clearly  hoped  to  move  Europe  toward  a  more 
intergovernmental and perhaps more plebiscitary  form.  Yet his  efforts to achieve this goal were 
strictly  subordinated  to economic  interests,  above  all  the  realization  of the CAP.  Whatever de 
Gaulle might have desired in theory, the Fouchet Plan served in practice primarily as a "deliberate 
deception" designed to disguise his true economic and  institutional motivations.  Accordingly, one 
.., Peyrefitte. C'dait. W284-l85, 214. De Gaulle's disappointment with the Elysee Treaty is often cited by geopolitical analyses as a cause of his 
willingness to threaten breaking up the EC to achieve the CAP. Yet de Gaulle's explicit threats to withdraw unless the CAP were aeated dale back 
before it was clear that arrangements for political coop<ntion in the Franco-German Treaty of  1963 would be limited by an explicit commitment to 
!>lATO introduced into the preamble by the Bundestag.  cf.  Miriam Camps. Euronean Unification in the Sixties:  From the Veto to the Crisis (New 
45 of his closest colleagues recalled, when the Fouchet Plan collapsed, de Gaulle "did not mourn"; to 
the  contrary,  having  come  to  see  political  cooperation  as  hampering  his  ambitions  for  an 
independent foreign policy, he let it go.
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C. The British Applications for Membership: 
"We'll Just Have to Find New Reasons to Make your Membership Impossible" 
From  1958  through  early  1969,  de  Gaulle's France  blocked  various  free  trade  area (FTA) 
proposals advanced by Britain, as well as British entry into the EC. In December 1958, after gaining 
Adenauer's support,  de Gaulle vetoed British FT  A  proposals outright,  calling  on the British-
disingenuously, as we shall see-to join the EEC and to accept the same obligations as the other 
Community partners, particularly regarding the CAP, external tariff and social harmonization. Early 
in 1960, after forming the European Free Trade Area (EFT  A) with Denmark, Portugal, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Norway, Austria and Ireland-a British move aimed almost entirely at exerting pressure 
on France-Britain and its new partners called for an EFTA-EC agreement. The negotiations were 
again  fruitless,  largely  due  to French  obstruction.  When  Reginald  Maudling,  the  chief British 
negotiator,  asked  Robert  Ma.Ijolin,  former  head  of the  Organization  for  European  Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC), a French negotiator of the Treaty of Rome, and then an EC Commissioner 
(and  himself something  of an  Atlanticist)  what  France  would  do  if Britain  agreed  to  all  its 
conditions, he replied: "We [would] just have to think of  new reasons which make your membership 
impossible. "
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York: Magraw-Hill Books. 1966), 16, 117. 
81 Lacouture. De Gaulle. 350. also 362. 
119 CITE. Sabine Lee. "'Germany and the First Enlargement Negotiations 1961-1963" (unpublished paper 1996), 12, also 3-7; Lacouture, De Gaulle. 
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Integration (Stanford: Stanford Univenity Press. 1963),  142-143, 147-149; Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years.  1947-1963: The Emerging Truth 
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46 Little changed when Macmillan announced in mid·l961 the step for which de Gaulle had called, 
namely a British application for EC membership. De Gaulle immediately reversed his encouraging 
rhetoric  concerning  British  membership,  terming  the  decision  "an  unpleasant  surprise"  and 
encouraging Britain to withdraw it.  Yet he was little concerned, as  we have seen,  for he initially 
expected  domestic  opposition  within  Britain  to  block  the  necessary  economic  and  political 
concessions on the Commonwealth and agriculture. 
90 The General confidentially affirmed to close 
advisors  his  absolute  rejection  of British  membership  but  noted  the  need  to  delay.  British 
ambassadors in Paris sensed this, reporting back to London that de Gaulle would probably wait for 
elections  in  November  1962,  in  which  support  from  pro-EC  farmers  and  centrist  parties  was 
required, then impose its veto. De Gaulle, we should seemed set against British entry from the start 
and made little effort to reach agreement. 
91 
Yet the British persevered. When French officials realized in mid-1962, much to their surprise, 
that  Macmillan  was  in  fact  genuinely  willing  to  make  all  the  economic  concessions  on 
Commonwealth  preferences  that  France  had  been  requesting,  French  demands  hardened. 
Pessimistic prognoses were issued in an attempt to force a British withdrawal, thereby transferring 
the responsibility for the collapse of  negotiations onto Britain. A committee was reportedly formed 
in the Quai d'Orsay to design means of impeding British entry.  Seeking to impose a fait accompli, 
the French rapidly sought agreement on agricultural provisions within the EEC directly at variance 
with British proposals, while misleading the British about their actions.  Pierson Dixon, the British 
ambassador  in  Paris,  viewed  this  in  retrospect  as  the  "end  of the  negotiations. "
92  The  British 
zwischen  1955  (Spaak-Komitt.ee) und  1961  CEWG-Beitriu.sverhandlungm\ (Freiburg!Breisgau:  Rombach,  1968),  116; ueber, British.  76-90; Sir 
Norman Kipping, Summing Up (London: Hutchinson, 1972). 160 
90 CITE. Lamb. ?.facmillan. 144. 
91  Peyrefrtte. C'd&it. l/303-304; Lacouture. De Gaulle. 355-357. 
92 Alastair Home. Harold ?.facmillan  Vol.  2  (New York:  Viking,  1988), 111257;  ?.fa~:millan on Dixon, in Lamb, Macmillan,  144,  166,  172-175; 
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47 continued to make concessions and by December 1962 most participants believed a final agreement 
was just around the comer~ a marathon session scheduled for January 1963 was expected to resolve 
outstanding issues. 
93 However, after an unexpectedly successful showing in parliamentary elections, 
de Gaulle announced a decision to veto at the Cabinet meeting of 17 December 1962, where he 
ridiculed Macmillan by quoting the famous Edith Piaf song, "Ne pleurez pas Milord. ("Do not cry, 
my Lord."}-a quotation that soon leaked.
94 At his celebrated press conference a month later, on 14 
January  1963, the General  delivered  the coup  de  grace,  speaking  at length of the  reasons  why 
Britain was unready to adopt a "genuinely European" approach.
95 
At the end of  the decade, however, Gaullists reversed course. De Gaulle did discourage efforts 
in 1966-1967 by the Wilson government to apply for membership, but during the final  months of 
his presidency and the first of  his successor, his former Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, French 
policy softened. In 1969, during the last weeks of  his presidency, de Gaulle approached the British 
government about establishing an intergovernmental substitute for the EEC, which he termed the 
"European Economic  Association."  Though the  negotiations  failed  due  to  embarrassing  British 
revelations-the "Soames Affair"-Pompidou maintained the policy. In his first press conference as 
President  on  I 0  July,  Pompidou  noted  that  France  had  no  objection  in  principle  to  British 
membership, a statement that opened the door to successful negotiations concluded in 1973.
96 
How can we best explain this pattern of rejection under during the de Gaulle years, followed by 
initiatives for  closer cooperation under de Gaulle in  1969 and  strong move to accept Britain as  a 
member by Pompidou, who felt he had de Gaulle's approval, shortly thereafter? Critical portions of 
dou._ed his ambassadors.  exaggerating the willin!!Jiess  of the Germans and Dutda to pressure Paris.  Brenke, EuropakonZQ!tionen,  631. Olhen 
suggest that Macmillan was pessimistic from the start. expetting a Frenda veto.  Kaiser,  Using.  Peyrefitte, C'eta!t 299-304; Wolfram  Kaiser, "The 
Bomb and Europe: Britain. France, and the EEC Entry Negotiations, 1961-1963," Journal of  European Integration History 1:1 (1995), 85. 
93  Willis. France. 299-305: Lamb. Macmillan, 196-197.202. 
94 Cogan. Charles de Gaulle. 141; Maillard, De Gaulle. 184-185. 
·~ For a v<:rbatim transcript, see Jovve, Oen«al. II/283-286. 
96 Philip Ziegler. Wilson: The Authorized Biography (London: Harper/Collins,  1995), 334; Knapp,  Gaullism, 417-418; Simon z.  Young. Terms of 
48 the evidence are summarized in Table Two. Surely, the consensus among observers has long held, 
de  Gaulle's  hostile  attitude  toward  Britain,  more  than  any  other  episode,  demonstrates  the 
geopolitical basis ofhis European policy.  The "real problem," in the words of the General's most 
celebrated biographer, was ''the participation of Britain in the realization of Charles de  Gaulle's 
grand design, the construction of  a Europe of  States.  ,,c;
7 De Gaulle, already souring on Europe due to 
the demise of  the Fouchet Plan, feared that Britain would be a ''Trojan Horse" for US geopolitical 
designs like the MLF, thereby fiustrating his vision of  an alternative European confederation based 
on the Fouchet Plan or something similar. Charles Cogan speaks for many analysts when he argues 
that in vetoing Britain: 
De Gaulle's reasoning  appears to have  been the  following:  ...  He 
thought he  could  establish  nuclear  hegemony  over the  rest  of the 
continent of  Western Europe by virtue c ::  (I) the suppression of the 
Multilateral  Force,  which  would  have  put  nuclear  weapons  in  the 
hands  of continental  powers,  (2) the  exclusion  of Great  Britain,  a 
nuclear power,  from  a  continental  grouping  by  his  veto of British 
entry into the Common Market.
98 
Still others cite de Gaulle's anger at Macmillan's failure to tell him about the Polaris nuclear deal 
made with the US at Nassau on 21  December and his failure to clearly offer nuclear cooperation-
an impression apparently cultivated subsequently by French officials. 
99 
Yet  such  interpretations of de  Gaulle's  motivations  in  blocking British  accession  are  based 
almost entirely upon literary interpretations of de  Gaulle's general writings and  utterances,  or on 
loose interpretations of  what de Gaulle must have had to believe, given his actions vis-a-vis NATO, 
the Third World, and the superpowers. There is in fact essentially no direct evidence of  geopolitical 
motivations for the veto of Britain.  To the contrary,  nearly all  of de  Gaulle's own statements and 
Entry: Bnt.ain's Neg~iations  with the Eurooean Community, 1970-1972 (London: Heinemann, 1973), 4-S. 
97 Lacouture. De Gaulle, 347. 
91 Cogan, Oldest Allies, 128. 
99 Berstein. Rmublic, 173. 
49 those of  his close associates supports the view that de Gaulle vetoed British membership,  despite 
common  geopolitical  interests  on  many  issues  (not  least  shared  opposition  to  supranational 
institutions and concern about Germany) because Britain was certain to block generous financing 
for the CAP.  This would have eliminated the principal advantage for France from the EC customs 
union vis-a-vis an PTA.  Hence France had nothing to lose by pressing to keep the British out. If 
France let  Britain into the EC,  Britain  and  Germany  would block the CAP  and  the EC would 
become,  in  essence,  an  FT  A.  If  France  alienated  her  partners  by  blocking  Britain,  she  might 
succeed; if she failed, the only  option for the others was to accept British proposals for an FT A, 
which was no worse--now that French industry increasingly competitive--than letting the British 
In. 
Let  us  begin  with  de  Gaulle's  public  statements.  The  General  often  spoke  about  the 
unpreparedness of Britain to be  '1ruly European" and  about conflicts  with  the "Anglo-Saxons." 
Metaphors like that of  a "Trojan horse" were often invoked.
100 Almost without exception, however, 
statements  by  de  Gaulle  about  British  commitment  to  the  EC  refers  explicitly  to  economic 
justifications at greater length and  in  much greater detail than geopolitical ones;  in  a number of 
important  cases,  he  dwells  exclusively  on  economic  interests--even though  one  might  expect 
geopolitical  concerns  to  offer  a  more  expedient  excuse,  the  language  of "grandeur''  and 
"independence"  being  popular  in  France.  This  is  true  of de  Gaulle's  memoirs,  in  which  his 
explanation  of opposition  to  an  FT A  and  British  membership  never  mentions  geopolitical  or 
ideational  issues, but instead repeats that ''without the common tariff and agricultural preference, 
there could be no valid European Community."
101 
'"" E.17. Laoo111.ure, De Gaulle, 3'3; Bund=cpublik Deulsl.:blmd. Akten 1%3, I. Documem 94. 
101  de Gaulle. Memoirs. 187. also 187-189,218-220. 
50 The same is true of  de Gaulle's most widely cited justification for the veto, the celebrated press 
conference of 14 January 1963  where it was announced.  Speaking more slowly and clearly than 
usual in response to a planted question, the General devotes nearly 1500 words to what he termed a 
"clear'' explanation of  the veto of  British membership. In this response he speaks of  Britain's lack  · 
of commitment to ''Europe" without ever mentioning any  disagreement with  Anglo-Saxons over 
security issues. the Fouchet Plan, the Multi-Lateral Force (MLF). political union. or any other non-
economic concerns. He dwells instead exclusively on commercial matters, focusing particularly on 
the  contradiction  between  long-standing  British  trading  patterns  and  future  Treaty  of Rome 
commitments in the "essential" area of agriculture.  He notes that British membership  is  difficult 
primarily  because  the  Continent  is  different  in  economic  structure  than  the  "insular, 
maritime ... essentially  industrial  and  commercial  and  hardly  agricultural"  Britain.  His  oft-cited 
concerns about the US  ("the colossal  Atlantic  area under American dominance") is  restricted to 
concern about overwhelming US  "economic" influence and the purported US  desire,  along with 
Britain, to promote European trade liberalization without a preferential arrangement for agriculture, 
which ''would completely alter the whole set of  arrangements, understandings, compensations, rules 
that have already been drawn up among the Six ... The cohesion of  its members ...  would not last for 
long."  These  problems  arise  because  of "peculiarities"  of various  countries  as  regards  their 
"economic relations ... above all with the United States." It is difficult to imagine a more lucid and 
direct description of  the economic differences between Britain and the Continent in agriculture; by 
contrast,  even  when  asked  directly  about the  MLF  and  security  problems,  de  Gaulle  makes  no 
mention ofthe EC.
102 
De Gaulle's statements at closed Cabinet sessions and meetings with close advisors during the 
critical  period  from  1961  to  1965  echo  these  statements,  thus  offering  further  support  for  the 
102 Jouve. Omen!. 111492-498. Some years later, de Gaulle does mention Nassau in a brief  allusion to the vt:to. Jouve, Gfneral W380-381. 
51 conclusion that agriculture, not geopolitics, aeoounted for his opposition to British membership. In 
secret  discussions  at the  Elysee  in  1961,  de  Gaulle  stated  that  British  entry  would  "overturn 
everything, [leading to] a completely different Common Market. 
11  At a closed meeting at the Elysee 
in  1962,  he  asserts that his "principal interest"  was the defense of the CAP,  which would  help 
French agriculture "take off, 
11  as  had French industry.  The source of the dispute with Britain, he 
explains, lies in economic structure: The transition from agriculture to industry occurred a hundred 
years ago in Britain, while it is still continuing in France-creating different political imperatives. 
Britain, he notes, would oppose any plans fora CAP, perhaps in alliance with Germany or even 
Italy and the Netherlands. (This was quite true; one reason for the British membership bid raised in 
confidential Whitehall discussions was to do just this. Even if  they had been so inclined, the British 
had no way to provide a credible commitment to permit centralized financing arrangements to be 
created-decisions that  were  not  taken  until  the  late  1960s.
103
)  At  the Cabinet  meeting  of 17 
December  1962,  where the final  decision to  veto the British application was taken, the General 
again stressed agriculture. He emphasized that the one question the British could not answer is why 
a customs union with the EFTA countries would not simply become an industrial free trade zone. 
Hours before the 14 January 1963  press conference and  then again at a cabinet meeting ten days 
later, he observed to his closest advisors that the British might well be invited to join after the CAP 
was  irreversibly  established.  In none  of these  sessions  is  there  direct  mention  of geopolitical 
motivations for the veto.
104 
101 Agriroltural considerations also make the greatest sense of  de Gaulle's willin!Jiess to encourage an applicatioo from pro-NATO Denmark. hardly a 
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"ineldricably  mixed."  (11303]  De  Gaulle notes:  "The problem  is  to  get  the  British  into the existing Commm  Market,  nat to  deal  with  the 
Commonwealth." and predicted to Maurice Schumann that the UK would enter, nat under a Labour government, but under Heath thereafter. (CITE, 
132] See also Silj, Eurme's, 87-88; Alfred Grosses-,  Frendt FOI"ei!!Jl  Policv under de Gaulle (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 82-4, De Gaulle was quite 
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52 Turning  from  de Gaulle to his  associates,  a comprehensive  survey of statements by ·French 
government officials reveals not even one direct acknowledgement of  geopolitical motivations; all 
point to commercial motivations. Just before the veto, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville tried to 
make  it clear-to the  point of tendentiousness--.--that  the  critical .issue  was  not-Commonwealth· 
preferences, but "financial regulation" of  agriculture.
10s In January 1963, when asked to account for 
the France veto, he responded: 
106 
The answer is simple.  The entire history of international cooperation 
in  agricultural  matters  consists  of promises  [that]  put  off future 
transformations .... The  keystone·  [is]  the  financial  provision  .. .It  is 
evident  that  we could  not  have  let  a  new  member  enter  ... without 
having settled in the most precise manner this essential matter. 
He added later: "A new member cannot be admitted into an unfinished club."
107 De Gaulle's Prime 
Minister  and  successor,  Pompidou,  and  his  Agricultural  Minister,  Edgar  Pisani,  maintained 
subsequently  that the  veto  forestalled  an  Anglo-German  alliance  to  undermine  CAP  financing. 
Pisani quotes the General  as  saying:  "France is  not  opt>5>sed  to British entry into the EC, but it 
refuses  to permit  such entry to call  into  question  the  CAP.  When  Britain accepts  all  the rules, 
everything will  be fine."
108 Debre observed later that France had good reason to want Britain for 
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1011  Pisani.  General.  102.  also 99-102)  Despite a  ritualistic  claim  that  de Gaulle  was  motivated  by  geopolitical  vision.  Pompidou  is  cited  in 
Bodmheimer. Political. 127. CHECK. See also Silj, 90ff. Agricuhure Minister Pisani's advice was that even if  the British accept the CAP, their anti· 
agricultural preferene<'S  will  call into question implemfl11.alion  of the 1962  agricultural agreement, Peyrefitte, C'etait.  1!57-158,  CHECK.  See also 
Jebb. Memoirs, 292ff. cf. Lacouture, De Gaulle, 356-358: Robert Marjolin. Architect of  European Unity: Memoirs. 1911-1986 (London: Weidmfeld 
and Nicolson. 1989). 320. 340. 358. c( 338-339.  There is little reason why these French officials should be misleading; the geopolitical explanation 
was. after all. more legitimate. Couve. for example, would have f:llt:ry incmtive to exaggaate the geopolitical elements, since a decisive role for the 
Nassau agreement would absolve him of widespread charges of  diplomatic duplicity. See Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a 
European (London: Weidenfeldand Nicolson. 1971), 476 ff. 
Prate <Batailles. 62-63) speculates that political factors  were ''Undoubtedly primary" in de Gaulle's veto of Britain, citing the Nassau agreement, 
adding that economics. particularly agriculture. had a "great weight.'' This judgement must be taken seriously, if it is not ironically meant, but it is 
unsupported by the f:llidence Prate presents. He did not participate in the decision to veto and, as we shall see below, the Nassau meeting could not 
have intluenced iL 
53 reasons  of principle;  it  would  be good to be  supported by  another ally· opposed to transfers  of 
sovereignty, but national interests did not permit it at the time.
109 
De Gaulle and his officials advanced the same arguments to their foreign counterparts, including 
Macmillan and Adenauer.  Around the time of  the veto, it is true, de Gaulle sometimes mentioned 
both  economic  and  political  concerns  regarding  Britain  in  the  same  breath,  but  the  economic 
arguments invariably come first and are treated in more detaiL  In discussions with German leaders 
he  stresses that an "industrial trade arrangement with 'England  could easily be reached," but not 
within  the  EC,  because  "agriculture  is  a  French  vital  interest  and  for  France  to  maintain  its 
agriculture with England as  a member,  England would have to stop being England." Similarly, a 
GATT  agreement  could  be  reached,  but  the  CAP  must  be  maintained. 
110  German  diplomats 
subsequently conducted an  extensive review of the  diplomatic  record,  including over a hundred 
individual  references,  and  concluded  that  de  Gaulle's  primary  motivation  was  to  protect  the 
agricultural policy.
111 British officials themselves agreed that it was in the end the issue of financial 
regulation of agriculture that was the "sticking point" or "Achilles heel"  over which France sought 
to  block  formation  of an  Anglo-German  coalition. 
112  When  de  Gaulle  vetoed  Harold  Wilson's 
109 Debre. Memoires. 428. 
110 HermaiUl Kusterer. Der Kanzler Wld der General (Stuttgart: Neske. 1995). 318. 350-352. 
111  Bwtdesrepublik Deutschland, Akten  1963 contains  much  evidence:  On 5 December  1962, the head of  the political department in  the German 
Foreign  Ministry,  Dr.  Jansen, concluded from  discussions  in  Paris that he was "pretty certain" about de Gaulle's intartions, the concern was the 
conflict between the EC and the Commonweahh. not the US.  [Doc. 21 I 1n his first set of face-to-face discussions with Adenauer following the veto, 
De Gaulle stressed that for him the "aitical point" was the lack of  British commitment to a "real Common Market.," by which he meant that without a 
"common external tariff' and "common rules  ...  particularly in agriculture" a European CommlUlity based on "economic interests" would collapse.  De 
Gaulle continued to pursue the agricultural issue, Wltil his interlocutor changed the subjed.. [Doc. 431 In a private meeting with representatives in the 
National Assembly. de Gaulle observed that the UK was a "Trojan Horse" not for US  geopolitical goals, but for US efforts to break into the European 
market.  Public speeches by Couve and de Gaulle conveyed the same message. [Doc. 94)  Italian and German officials "a!Veed" that a!Vicuhure was 
the "key" issue. [Doc. 24)  De Gaulle also mentioned in private the need for a Labour government to make the "necessary changes" for membership-a 
view consistart with a concern about decolonization. [Doc. 32,391  Both Couve, the French Foreign Minister, and various German officials who were 
negotiating directly with the French. stated that economics was predominant. [Docs. 60, 77, 94] Only Adcnauer, in defending de Gaulle's motivations 
to third governments, stressed geopolitics. [Doc. 551  See also Kusterer, Kanzler. 317ff. 
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Willis.  France. 299-305.  De Gaulle's discussions  with  Ma~:rnillan, cited in  ddail later in this  arti~le, reveal the arne p.Uem: e.t;.  Rewrd of 
Macmillan-de Gaulle meetin& 2 June 1962 (PREM 1113775), 8.  Even Macmillan seems to have accepted the primacy of agriculture in  retrOllped.. 
Home. Macmillan. ILI428. Also Lamb, Macmillan, 196-197,202. 
54 tentative move toward a membership bid in 1967, Wilson was informed through back channels that 
it was because Pompidou had raised economic objections. 
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The preeminence  of economic  interests  is  mirrored  strikingly  in  the  transcripts  of bilateral 
summits  between de  Gaulle and  Macmillan in  1962.  These  meetings  uncovered  more  areas  of 
geopolitical agreement than disagreement. Again, bits and pieces of these summit discussions are 
sometimes cited out of  context to support geopolitical concerns; taken as a whole, however, these 
discussions  do  not  support  such  an  interpretation.  Each  has  a  similar  form:  De Gaulle  presses 
Britain on agriculture, while Macmillan resists. Macmillan raises security issues, consistent with the 
centerpiece of  the British strategy, which was from the beginning to offset de Gaulle's fundamental 
objections (Macmillan appears not to have been sure whether they were economic or geopolitical) 
with geopolitical, perhaps nuclear, concessions. The two leaders consistently found they had more 
in common in geopolitical matters than in commercial ones.
114 
At Chateau de Champs in June 1962, de Gaulle begins the meeting by emphasizing the absolute 
French imperative to export agricultural goods and  insistently raising the issue of Commonwealth 
imports, which he terms "the most fundamental" issue. Macmillan, hoping that British concessions 
on defense cooperation will overcome de Gaulle's objections and appearing not to understand the 
centrality of agriculture to  de Gaulle's position,  insists  on  transitional  arrangements  and  hinted 
several times that Britain would refuse to pay more than its "fair share" for the CAP. He rejects de 
Gaulle's proposal that Commonwealth imports be limited only to tropical products like cocoa and 
coffee  and  reiterates  the  centrality  of beef and  wheat  exports  for  the  British  Commonwealth. 
Consistent with his strategy of seeking a geopolitical quid pro quo, Macmillan repeatedly tries to 
m Philip Ziegler, Wilsoo: The Authorized Biomphy (Loodoo: Harper/Collins, 19951334. 
114 De Gaulle himself  portrays the me«ings in this way. de Gaulle:. Memoirs, 217-220. 
55 shift  the  conversation  away  from  "less  important"  economtc  issues,  only  to  have  the  General 
repeatedly shift the topic back. 
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When,  halfway through the  session,  de  Gaulle  finally  permits the discussion to  move  on to 
geopolitics, the two statesmen immediately find themselves in much closer agreement. De Gaulle 
asserts  that his  predecessors  had  created  the  Common  Market  for  political  ends,  but that the 
supranational institutions should be replaced by intergovernmental cooperation among the larger 
powers  of Europe--a position  close  to Macmillan's.  (On  supranational  institutions,  the  major 
French  internal  strategy document  in this period refers  to the positions of the two  countries  as 
"sisters."
116
)  De Gaulle remarks that for security vis-a-vis Russia it would probably be better to 
have the British in the EC  and  concedes that "in the last resort"  France has  more  confidence in 
Britain than in Germany.  When the General asks whether Britain was ready to adopt a European 
attitude on these issues, Macmillan assures him that Britain is prepared to strengthen the European 
end of  the NATO alliance. (At around the same time, Macmillan also declared his public support 
for the Fouchet Plan. 
117
)  Both agree that progress toward political cooperation in Europe was not 
being made, but in economic areas the  major obstacle to British membership was its "many ties 
outside Europe." Macmillan emerged euphoric with the view that Britain and France had agreed on 
three major points: that Britain would renounce preferential trading rights with the Commonwealth, 
that  a  common  agricultural  policy  was  essential  for  France,  and  that  France  and  Britain  must 
cooperate on nuclear weapons to form  the "backbone of a European defense." Apparently  in  an 
effort to disguise the consistency of his motives, de Gaulle later removed from his memoirs nearly 
all reference to this optimistic dialogue.
118 The convergence of interest between Britain and France 
115 Record of  a Cooversatioo at the Chateau de Champs, 2 June 1962. PREM I 113175,7-9.  Also Record of  a Conversatioo at the Chateau de Champs, 
3 JW!e 1962. PREM I l/3775. 14. 
116  Jouve. Gmeral. W492-498. 
117 Lacouture. De Gaulle. 348. 
ns Record of 3 June me«ing. 11-14, especially 13; 14ff, 17-18; de Gaulle, Mem~  218-220. On the events and de Gaulle's memoirs, the French 
56 was quite clear to practitioners and  commentators alike.  The Belgi~ Josef Luns, called for the 
participation of Britain in the Fouchet Plan, remarking:  "If we are going to make Europe in the 
English manner, we might a well do it with England."
119 The seasoned observer of  French foreign 
policy,  Alfred  Grosser,  observed  later  that  if de  Gaulle  had  genuinely  sought  to  emasculate· 
supranational institutions, he would have done better to choose London rather than Bonn as  his 
ally.12o 
The summit  six  months later at Rambouillet revealed the same convergence of geopolitical 
vision. Analysts have focused on whether or not Macmillan offered nuclear cooperation and have 
completely  overlooked  the  direct  evidence  that  de  Gaulle  privileged  economic  interests  over 
geopolitical ones. De Gaulle concedes that the Fouchet Plan had failed and thus British membership 
would not further dampen the prospects for European foreign policy cooperation. In the course of 
the talks, the two reiterate their shared  opposition to supranational  institutions.  Nonetheless,  de 
Gaulle maintains, it is "not possible for Britain to enter tomorrow." The "main problem," Macmillan 
notes-for the first time acknowledging the centrality of economic interests-is "agriculture." De 
Gaulle agrees. France, he argues, seeks to establish certain EEC policies~ once they are definitively 
established, Britain and  the Scandinavian countries could enter.  This, Macmillan observes, is  "a 
most serious statement.''
121  Throughout,  de Gaulle  showed little  serious  interest in  Macmillan's 
efforts to offer a strategic quid pro quo, seeking to avoid the topic in their talks. 
The timing of the French veto more clearly confirms the primacy of commercial interests over 
geopolitics. We may begin by rejecting outright the oft-conjectured causal link between the Anglo-
American agreement at Nassau to deploy Polaris missiles on UK submarines and de Gaulle's veto. 
ambassador to London. Geoffioy de Courcel is cited in Lacouture, De Gaulle, 354. 
119 Lacouture, De Gaulle, 349. 
120 Alfred Grosser, La Politiaue ext.erieure de Ia V' RfJ)ubligue (Paris: Le Seuill96S), 140. 
m  PRO. Prem 11/4230. On debates about the  transcripts of  the meding. Lamb. Macmillan, 166, 192-3. 
57 We now know that the General repeatedly hinted that he intended to veto many months in advance 
and announced the final decision to do so at a Cabinet meeting on 17 December 1962-a few days 
before the US-UK summit at Nassau and a fully week before the French government had completed 
its analysis of  it. Hence neither the Anglo-American summit nor de Gaulle's sense of  "betrayal" by· 
Macmillan  could  have  played  any  role  in  his  decision-a conclusion uniformly  backed by  the 
recollections  of French  participants.  By  contrast,  an  approach  focusing  on  enduring  electoral 
concerns  provides  a  superior  explanation  of the  timing  of the  veto.  Having  broken  with  pro-
European parties and survived the parliamentary elections of  November 1962 with an unexpectedly 
strong majority, de Gaulle could now afford the criticism an outright veto was sure to generate-a 
calculus predicted by the British Ambassador and some French officials some months previously.
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Perhaps  the  most  striking  evidence  in  favor  of economic,  rather  than  geopolitical  and 
ideological, motivations is the continuity of  French policy over the transition from the Fourth to the 
Fifth Republic and its change in  1969. Under the Fourth Republic, the satisfaction of agricultural 
interests had been a necessary condition for ratification of the Rome Treaty.  Accordingly, the last 
governments of  the Fourth Republic were completely unwilling to negotiate seriously on any sort of 
FT  A,  which they feared would call  into question the favorable treatment on agriculture, colonial 
products, and external tariffs France had obtained in the Treaty of  Rome.  An FT A enjoyed almost 
no par1iamentary support. When Anglo-EEC negotiations on an FTA opened in the fall of  1957, still 
under  the  Fourth  Republic,  French  representatives  rejected  British  suggestions  without  making 
counterproposals-just  as  de  Gaulle  was  to  do.  De  Gaulle,  despite  a  diametrically  opposed 
geopolitical strategy, maintained precisely the same policy as his much-maligned predecessors. 
m  There is no evidence to support Locator·s conjeaure that de Gaulle changed his mood due to the proclamation of Kennedy's "grand desii!Jl," de 
Gaulle" s triumphal tour of West Germany {"which brought his superiority complex to a height''), or the Skybolt aisis---« even difficulties over the 
details of  Commonwealth agriculture. which were on the verge of  resolution. Lacouture, De Gaulle, 3'4-358. More plausible is Franklin's conjetture 
that de Gaulle vetoed because Mansholt appeared capable of  forging an agricultural agreement. Sir Mark Franklin, "Father of  the European Common 
Agricultural Policy," Financial Times (4 July 1995), 3; Couve de Mu.rville, Politigue. 335; Maillard, De Gaulle, 184n. 
58 Similarly,  commercial  concerns  also  offer the  only  plausible explanation  of the reversal  in 
Gaullist policy at the end of  de Gaulle's reign, leading to a lifting of  the French veto. With the CAP 
out of the  way  and  British  industrial  firms  posing  a  much  diminished  threat  to their  French 
counterparts, Gaullist opposition to British membership receded.  As we have seen, this transition 
began under de Gaulle with the proposals for closer relations with Britain that led to the "Soames 
affair." If  anyone influenced de Gaulle at this juncture, it was Debre, who had long favored British 
entry-we have seen above-to bolster opposition to supranational institutions. If  any consideration 
other than the CAP influenced the General at this juncture, it was not a geopolitical issue, but the 
monetary conflict with Germany in  1968-1969.  Upon entering office,  Pompidou  swiftly  moved 
even further to accommodate the British request for membership, secure in the knowledge that he 
had the General's support.
123 
Nor, finally,  is  it coincidental that in exchange for finally lifting the French veto de Gaulle's 
handpicked successor, Pompidou, demanded a single non-negotiable concession, precisely the one 
that de Gaulle had predicted just before announcing his  1963  veto, namely prior agreement on a 
permanent financing arrangement for the CAP.  Britain and  France, as internal documents in both 
countries  had  long  predicted,  became  natural  allies  against  the  extension  of supranational 
institutions and worked together to establish a mechanism for European Political Cooperation. Like 
direct  evidence  of  motivations,  negotiating  strategy,  and  timing,  an  explanation  stressing 
commercial motivations predicts such a move; an explanation stressing geopolitical motivation can 
make no sense of  it.
124 
1v Vaisse, Grandeur, 607ft": Midle\ Jobat., Memoires d'avenir (Paris: Bernard Grasset,  1976~ 182·183. 
124 For a more detailed argument. see Moravcsik, Choice for Europe. Chapter Four. 
59 D. Institutional Reform and the "Empty Chair" Crisis: "A Million-and-a-Half Rural Votes" 
We move now the final major episode in de Gaulle's European policy-the "empty chair" crisis 
of 1965-66. The road toward crisis began when Commission President Walter Hallstein sought to 
exploit what he believed to be a transient moment of  French diplomatic wlnerability. The issue of  a 
permanent financing arrangement for the CAP stood before the six EC governments. France sought 
to lock in such financing as  securely as possible, without annual renegotiation, but opposed any 
increase in powers of  the Commission and Parliament. This was also the moment when the schedule 
agreed to in the Treaty of  Rome dictated that the EC move from the "second" to the "third" stage by 
introducing qualified majority voting in transport, agricultural and foreign trade policy.  With the 
first direct presidential elections under the revised constitution of  the Fifth Republic scheduled for 
December 1965, Hallstein expected de Gaulle to seek a swift compromise in order to placate the 
farm vote. Hence he linked provisions for increased Commission and Parliamentary powers to the 
proposal for permanent agricultural financing, expecting support from more federalist governments 
and thereby to secure a side payment from the French. 
Hallstein underestimated de Gaulle's determination and overestimated the other government's 
support.  The General immediately understood the tactic-the Commission, he said to associates, 
was "a spider seeking to trap France in  its net"-and sought to reverse it by upping the ante. 
125 
When the  negotiations reached a  deadline  in  the  CAP negotiations, the French government did 
not-as had  happened before-continue the search  for  a  compromise  solution,  but withdrew its 
permanent representative from Brussels and boycotted any meetings dealing with new EC policies. 
Commission compromises were  rejected~ discussion of new EC  policies halted.  This was not  a 
sudden  fit  of pique  on  de  Gau11e's  part;  as  we have  seen,  it  had  been foreseen  in  Peyrefitte's 
"prudently audacious" strategy five  years previously.  Nor was it a negotiating tactic designed to 
60 secure agreement on CAP or simply defeat the Commission proposals. On the eve of  the crisis the 
French cabinet meeting concluded that French proposals on CAP were close to acceptance and that 
the Commission was already a "big loser," having seen the rejection of its "absurd" institutional 
proposals by  almost  all  governments (not least the  Germans,  whose actions  did  not  match their · 
federalist rhetoric). Indeed, the Commission had been banished from key discussions. Early in the 
crisis,  moreover,  de  Gaulle rejected a compromise to implement the CAP proposals without any 
mention of  the Commission proposals. 
126 
Instead, de Gaulle, still following the "prudently audacious" plan of 1960, sought advantageous 
political  terrain-the CAP  was  nearly  in  place,  the  British  veto  was  behind  him,  and  a  weak 
government ruled Germany-on which to provoke a diplomatic showdown over basic institutional 
prerogatives in the EC.  In de Gaulle's words, France sought to "profit from the crisis" in order to 
get "rid of  false conceptions ... that expose us to the dictates of  others" and ''replace the Commission 
with something fundamentally different." The "empty chair" crisis was nothing short of a bid to 
reform the EC  fundamentally.  In internal  discussions,  de Gaulle mentioned that his  fundamental 
goals were to  strip  the  Commission  of its  unique  power of proposal,  to block the transition  to 
majority voting and to fire the current Commission. The French government also demanded that the 
Commission  change  its  name,  refrain  from  running  an  information  service,  abandon  accredited 
diplomatic  missions,  send  no  representatives  to  international  organizations,  cease  criticizing 
member  state policies  in  public,  submit  proposals  to the  Council  before  publicizing  them,  end 
mobilization  of domestic  groups,  and  draft  vaguer  directives.  Perhaps  most  important,  France 
m Peyrefllte. C' aait. Il/281. 594. 620. 
126 Peyrefllle. C'lltait. W289. 293 
61 sought  explicit  recognition  of the  right  of member  states to veto  majority .  votes  where  "vital 
interests" were at stake, with each acting as the sole judge of  what constitutes its vital interest.
127 
The boycott ended six months later with an agreement that gave de  Gaulle relatively little of 
what he had initially requested. To be sure, the Council was now to be represented alongside the 
Commission in EC foreign policy and press activities, while some symbolic changes were made in 
the language of  Commission prerogatives. The most important change was agreement on an extra-
legal  document, the "Luxembourg Compromise," which recognized the disagreement among the 
Six. It stated that when a particular majority vote threatens the "'vital national interest" of  a member 
state, there was informal agreement that discussion  should be prolonged and  acknowledged that 
France "considers that...discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached"_l
28 In 
addition, De Gaulle made a scapegoat of  Hallstein, forcing him to resign the Presidency. 
129 Yet no 
formal treaty changes resulted, QMV went forward, and the EC institutions remained-at least on 
paper-intact.-= 
What were de Gaulle's underlying motivations? Why did he settle for so much less than he had 
initially  sought?  It  is  customary  to  assert  that  de  Gaulle's  willingness  to  risk  electoral 
embarrassment and  diplomatic isolation during the "empty chair'' crisis of 1965-66 demonstrates 
the predominance of  nationalist ideas in his thinking. Disillusioned with the collapse of  the Fouchet 
Plan, suspicious ofUS proposals for an MLF and rebuffed by the Erhard government in Germany, it 
'
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Commooities." (Brussels: Unpublished Paper, 15 September 1966  ). 
m  Willis. France. 361. 
62 is argued, de Gaulle adopted a more "brutal" style of  negotiation, which· almost led to the collapse 
of  the EC.
130 
There is some truth here. As in the case of  the Fouchet Plan, there is no denying that de Gaulle 
sought to quash the move to supranationalism and there are at least two types of  evidence to suggest 
that this goal stemmed in part from distinctive geopolitical ideas.  One is the ambiguity of French 
material interests. In January 1965, de Gaulle requested an internal French government assessment 
of  the consequences of  a transition to QMV, which concluded that it was unlikely to undermine any 
vital French interest.
131  We do not know precisely what the thinking was, but the judgement does 
not seem outlandish. The moribund transport policy posed no threat. While QMV in the CAP and 
GATT might threaten French gains-a point to which we shall return in a moment-it would also 
place greater pressure on a consistently recalcitrant Germany to accept lower prices, the temporary 
German exemption in this area notwithstanding. Finally, the overall impact of  unanimity voting was 
limited because the Treaty in any case retained it for the most open-ended decisions.  The Treaty 
dictated that new  policies, Treaty amendments harmonization of domestic regulations,  fiscal  and 
social  policy,  new  sources of Community funding,  association agreements and  accession of new 
members to the EC all required a unanimous vote. 
The second type of evidence supporting the  importance of geopolitical  ideas is the strikingly 
symbolic  nature of the  General's  public and  private  rhetoric  on the subject.  He  contemptuously 
dismissed  the  vision of Hallstein  "decked  out  in  the  trappings  of sovereignty"  and  consistently 
criticized  the  very  idea  of governance  above  the  nation-state.  He  lashed  out  even  at  those 
Commissioners,  notably  Robert  Matjolin,  who  had  sided  with  the  French  government. 
Occasionally-though this  was  very  rare,  as  compared  to  the  constant  references  to  farming 
130 Btntein. Republic. 17l·l1J. 
63 interests--de Gaulle  invoked the grandeur of France. 
132  He may  have  felt  what  Hoffmann  has 
described as  a vague "determination to prevent  ... a leap  into that supranational  nirvana where his 
chances of  directly influencing shared European policies might vanish."
133 
Although this interpretation is  plausible and  probably in part true, it is worth noting that the 
small amount of  available direct evidence of  de Gaulle's own views appears to support the primacy 
of commercial considerations. Privately, the General was deeply concerned to retain control over 
votes on CAP financing,  GATT negotiations, and  any possible FTA negotiations. He consistently 
complained-as  always,  stressing  agriculture-that  QMV  might  be  exploited  to  undermine 
carefully negotiated arrangements for net EC financial transfers to French farmers.  The logic was 
simple:  Even with  progress through  1964, the  CAP  was  not  yet  safe  from  reversal  through the 
combined efforts of the Danish, British and  US  pressure in  GATT  negotiations.  This  might,  de 
Gaulle  feared,  permit  the "Americans  to  inundate  the European  market  with  their  agricultural 
commodities."
134  France  therefore  had  to  maintain  control  over  both  the  CAP  and  GATT 
negotiations through  a veto.  This  was  also the  most  commonly  cited  motivation in  de  Gaulle's 
public rhetoric of  the period. It is backed by the recollections of  many of  his associates. By contrast, 
there  is  not  a single  piece of documentary  evidence  to support the  conjecture  that  the  boycott 
stemmed from de Gaulle's anger over Kennedy's proposals for a Multilateral Force (MLF) or any 
other geopolitical consideration. 
135  Not by  chance, then,  did the Kennedy Round conclude a year 
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64 later with an unambiguous victory for France in agriculture-the one area where U.S. pressure for 
liberalization was rebuffed. 
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The continuity of policy-in particular the fa<tt that in many ways de Gaulle's insistence on a 
veto  simply  passed  the  policy  of his  Fourth  Republic  predecessors  on  to  his  Fifth  Republic 
successors unchanged-further suggests the primacy of economic motivations.  Fourth Republic 
governments had sought to place stronger veto rights in the Treaty ofRome. In December 1957, just 
after ratification and before de Gaulle entered office, a Quai d'Orsay study had already isolated two 
means of  maintaining de facto unanimity voting after the transition to QMV foreseen for 1966. One 
was a perpetual veto of  the transition to the third stage, the other retention of  the national veto on 
essential questions as a precondition for approving the transition. De Gaulle reviewed these studies, 
considered both options, and chose one. The first was somewhat more difficult as,  having already 
moved to the second stage in exchange for an initial framework agreement on the CAP, it would be 
difficult to move back entirely to an intergovernmental option, but de Gaulle nonetheless kept this 
option in mind. 
137 He thus eventually turned to the second option. 
Yet in the end de Gaulle's motivations in provoking the "empty chair" crisis are not the critical 
issue. Even if  we were to concede that they were in large part ideational, the decisive constraint on 
French tactics remained French commercial interests. De Gaulle won the battle but lost the war, an 
irony of  which he himself was aware. 
138 What is most striking about the Luxembourg Compromise 
is how strikingly little of  what de Gaulle sought in the crisis he achieved. In every respect except the 
attainment of a de facto veto over external tariff policy, one commentator notes, "it was a victory 
for German diplomacy" because it kept France within the EC without major formal reforms.
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136 Vaisse. Grandeur, 559-560. 
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139 Le Figaro concluded that de Gaulle was "neither vidor nor vanquished." Vaisse, Grandeur, 559. 
65 To be sure, many maintain that the Luxembourg Compromise marked a major victory for de 
Gaulle  and  a  critical  turning  point  in  EC  history-a moment  when  the  supranational  style  of 
decision-making  pursued  up  to  1966  and  desired  by  France's partners  was  stunted.  De Gaulle 
himself boasted  that:  "The  CAP  is  in  place.  Hallstein  and  his  Commission  have  disappeared. 
Supranationalism is gone. France remains sovereign."
140 Peyrefitte does speak at one point of ''the 
defense of  the France's national interest coming before electoral interests."
141 
Yet  this  is  greatly  exaggerated.  In fact  much  of what  was  agreed  in  1966-notably the 
Luxembourg Compromise-was in the interests of  all governments. There was, moreover, nothing 
particularly Gaullist-or even particularly French-about suspicion toward majority voting without 
provisions for a veto. Just as de Gaulle was more pragmatic than his image, so the more federalist 
governments of  Germany and others were more cautious than their public rhetoric suggested. While 
the other five  governments opposed de Gaulle in public, each had strong interests in maintaining 
control over particular provisions of specific  policies,  for  example  the Germans  and  Italians  in 
agriculture  and  the  Dutch  in  transport.  The  Erhard  government,  wlnerable to a  vote to lower 
agricultural support prices and  skeptical of supranationalism in  principle, had already  demanded 
that  a de  facto  veto  be  granted  in  agricultural  price-setting.  It was  apparently  was  not  entirely 
disappointed to see the veto generalized. Had governments sought to employ QMV to impose lower 
agricultural prices on Germany  in  the coming decades,  there is  little doubt that Germany would 
have refused-as it did in 1985. 
142 Ten years later, a prominent EC report revealed that eight of  the 
nine members of  the EC, including France, were satisfied with the Luxembourg Compromise.
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66 The Luxembourg Compromise-an informal agreement to disagree-did somewhat dampen the 
tendency of countries to employ  majority  voting  in  agricultural and  foreign trade policy,  but it 
clearly failed to fundamentally divert the course of  European integration, as de Gaulle had hoped. 
According to the Treaty, new policies, notably regulatory harmonization and monetary cooperation, 
had in  any case to be approved unanimously, while attempts to invoke majority voting to impose 
lower agricultural prices would surely have been blocked or offset domestically by Germany. Rapid 
movement before 1966 took place under unanimity and, in some cases, without Commission power 
of  proposal. This is not to deny that de Gaulle's geopolitical ideology helped to fuel his disdain for 
supranational institutions or that de Gaulle did not successfully avoid the supranational trap set by 
the Commission, but he failed to impose his own agenda.  "As regards the long-term issues of the 
federalist-nationalist conflict," one contemporary commentator noted, ''the 1965-66 crisis changed 
nothing. "
144 
De Gaulle had sought much more.  The French defeat is clear if we compare the outcome to de 
Gaulle's original proposal for a fully  intergovernmental organization to replace the EC or, at  the 
very least, the elimination of qualified majority voting and the Commission's power of initiative. 
Neither  occurred.  It is  perhaps  only  a  slight  exaggeration  to  argue  that  ''the  value  of the 
Luxembourg agreements lay  precisely in  the fact  that they  had  no juridical value,  that the legal 
regulations remained intact, and that they did not restrict in any way [the EC's] future evolution and 
functioning."  Integration took other legal  forms~ when the governments  were  prepared  to  move 
ahead, they simply reinstated QMV. De Gaulle himself seems to have agreed with this pessimistic 
144 Lambort. Britain, 138; Moravcsik, Otoice for Europe, Otapter Three. Perhaps the strongest argument for the i~ortance  of  unanimity is the widely 
cited "joint decision trap" thesis advanced by Fritz Scharpf; in which unanimity voting constrains governments to maintain suboptimal equilibria, y~ 
even Scharpf concedes that there is little evidence that agricultural policy, his primary example, would in faa have been any different with majority 
voting.  Fritz Scharpf; "The Joint-Decision Trap:  Lessons from German Federalism and European  Integration," Public Administration 66 (Autumn 
1988),  251.  For  further  ~que of Scharpf's thesis,  see  Elmar  Rieger,  "Ag1arpolitik:  Integration  durch  Gemeinschafhllolitik?"  in  Markus 
Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch. eds., Europiiische Integration (Opladm: Lesk.e+Budrich, 1996), 401-428. 
67 assessment of the outcome, for  he  continued to advance proposals for fundamental  institutional 
refolltl, finally turning to the British as allies-thereby giving rise in 1969 to the "Soames affair."
145 
The main reason for de Gaulle's failure was not the overwhelming strength of the diplomatic 
coalition that opposed him-though the unwillingness of foreign parliaments to ratify  any treaty 
changes and the French fears that the five other Member States would tum to Britain surely played a 
role-but the weakness of  domestic support.
146 Had de Gaulle been concerned only with advancing 
his geopolitical ideology and had his domestic position been strong, he might have carried out a 
withdrawal,  as  occurred in  the case of NATO;  surely  an EC  without France would  have  been 
questionable. De Gaulle's position was far weaker than in the NATO crisis of 1966 and his failure 
to prevail in the "empty chair" crisis was preordained because, despite his flamboyant tactics, he 
was unwilling to risk withdrawal from the EC and the CAP.  The diplomatic tactics employed both 
by France and its partners betray full knowledge of  this decisive fact. Much of  what occurred during 
the second half of  1965 was in fact no more than shadow boxing. 
During the crisis the French government never so much as  hinted at  complete withdrawal;  a 
striking contrast to linkage successfully employed to achieve the CAP, an  issue that really  might 
have justified withdrawal, just a few  years previously--or the NATO crisis.  Top French officials 
confidentially assured their counterparts from  the  very  beginning of the crisis that France  could 
envisage no alternative to EC membership. When the French Permanent Representative in Brussels 
departed, his assistant remained to conduct essential ongoing business in writing. French diplomats 
boycotted meetings  on the development of new  policies,  such  as  fiscal  harmonization,  but they 
remained  present  on  committees  concerned  with  existing  policies,  such  as  the  CAP,  GATT 
negotiations and even the association of Greece and Turkey. As governments waited for the French 
14~ De Ia  Serre,  "European."  148,  citing the resuh.s  of a  colloquium in  Liege.  For a more complex assessment, see Joseph  H.  H.  Weiler,  "'The 
Transformation of Europe,'' Yale Law JoumallOO (1991). 
68 elections, plans were already being discussed to meet immediately thereafter-.  when the matter was 
rapidly resolved.  At home,  the government continued to prepare its budget for the forthcoming 
reduction in  internal EC tariffs, which was carried out on schedule during the boycott. It appears 
that, far from posing a frontal challenge to economic integration within the EC, de Gaulle exploited 
its irreversibility to press others for institutional reform. 
147 
De Gaulle's inability to pull out this stemmed not from geopolitical  considerations~ European 
political cooperation was, by this point,  dead.  It stemmed instead from  the domestic pressure of 
economic interests, led by farmers, whose opposition undermined the credibility of  French threats to 
withdraw from the EC.
148 In the presidential elections of  early 1966-the first direct elections under 
the revised constitution of  the Fifth Republic-the normally non-partisan peak farmers group, the 
FNSEA, recommended that its five million members cast votes against de Gaulle.  As a result, the 
General  failed  to achieve a first-ballot  majority.  He received only 44% of the votes, considered 
embarrassingly low for the man who had proposed the constitution. A pro-European but otherwise 
unremarkable centrist gained over 15%, disproportionately from rural areas, forcing a run-off with 
the Left, headed by  Fran~is Mitterrand. To be sure, de Gaulle triumphed in the second round, but 
still  by a disappointingly small  margin,  which he attributed to opposition from  farmers  over the 
question ofEurope.
149 
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69 De Gaulle and his advisors were painfully aware of the political irony:  A policy designed in 
large part to defend farm interests was interpreted by farm groups as a threat. It led de Gaulle to 
bitterly criticize "demagogues" among agricultural groups.  At first  depressed and despondent, de 
Gaulle first  considered resignation, then did  what had to be done.  At Peyrefltte's suggestion,  he 
restrained his anti-supranational rhetoric. In a rare admission of  error, he told his cabinet ministers 
that he had wrongly treated the fust round as a referendum rather than an election; he  made it a 
major  priority  thereafter to  restore  interest  group  support,  not  least  by  bolstering  support  for 
farmers. He turned more activities over to his prime minister.
150 Within a few months named Edgar 
Faure to be Minister of Agriculture with "a very precise aim:  to bring back to the  majority the 
million-and-a-half rural votes." Faure quickly raised milk and beef  prices, as well as removing a tax 
on wheat, while de Gaulle returned to the negotiating table in Brussels.
151 If  de Gaulle's goals were 
"audacious," his tactics remained "prudent." The modesty of the achievement, as compared to the 
sweeping ambition of  de Gaulle's initial hopes, reflected his willingness to jettison central elements 
of  the Gaullist vision to satisfy the narrowest and most self-interested of  domestic interest groups-
groups that de Gaulle had, upon entering office, tried and failed to defeat domestically. It was, as 
the  Belgian  federalist  Paul-Henri  Spaak  noted  later,  the  "revenge"  of the  other  five  member 
governments for the "humiliating" veto of  Britain in 1963.
152 All this marked a major turning point 
in de Gaulle's mode of  governance. 
"
0 Lacouture. De Gaull!;, :514-:523; Peyrefllle, C'  etait, ll/612. 
131 (")Newhouse. Collision. 127; Lindberg. "Integration." 239-245;  Fran~is Duchene, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman oflnterd!!llendence (New 
York:  Norton.  199:5),  27;  Fran~s-Hemi de Virielll.  La  fin  d'une agriculture (Paris:  Calmann-Levy,  1967), 46, cited in  William F.  Averyt,  Jr. 
Agrwolitics in the European Community: Interest Groups and the CAP (New York.: Praeger, 1977), 56-57, 64; "Agricultural Decisions of  July 1966," 
Common Market 6:11  (November 1966). 239; Edmund Neville-Rolfe, The Politics of Agriculture in the European  Community (London:  Policy 
Studies Institute, 1984), 370. 
m  Lacouture, De Gaulle. 361. Also Camps, Europe, :Z-3; Williams and Harrison, Politics, 342-346; Peyrefdte, C'etait, ll/CITE. 
70 m. BROADER IMPUCATIONS: REGIONAL INTEGRATION, IDEOLOGY, AND  THE 
RELA  TIONSBIP BETWEEN IDSTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The price of  wheat, not the grandeur ofFrance, was the vital national interest behind de Gaulle's 
European policy. We have seen that preponderance of  direct evidenc~ritical portions ofwhich 
are summarized in Tables One and Two-confirms that the most powerful and persistent motivation 
behind de Gaulle's European policy was commercial interest, in particular the promotion ofFrench 
agriculture, not the realization of  geopolitical interests and ideas. This is not to deny that de Gaulle 
sought geopolitical goals, but he treated them, rhetorically and tactically, as secondary.
153 Not only 
is the evidence for a geopolitical explanation scarce, but to explain anomalies, proponents have 
been forced into ad hoc assertions that de Gaulle was myopic, irrational, or impotent. Such accounts 
not only undermine the general explanation advanced by those who focus on de Gaulle's leadership, 
nearly all of  whom stress the steadfast vision and tactical genius behind Gaullist politics, but are 
contradicted at every tum by the available evidence. There is, moreover, good reason to believe that 
much of  the evidence that appears to support a geopolitical interpretation of  French policy was part 
of  a "deliberate deception" designed to "seduce" contemporaries into overlooking the narrow 
commercial interests underlying French policy. De Gaulle, as Stanley Hoffmann has brilliantly 
observed, excelled at such theatrics. He fooled not only the French public and some of  his own 
ministers, but generations ofbiographers and foreign policy commentators. For the most part, we 
have seen, de Gaulle pursued the same ends with the same means as other French statesmen would 
have--and his predecessors and successors in fact did. The most places where his policy appears to 
have been distinctive--above all his ability to impose the 1958 economic stabilization package 
m  E.g., Jouve, Geruiral, II/346. 
71 required to support trade liberalization-his contribution reflected not $0 IllUCh .a distinctive 
geopolitical vision but more effective domestic governance. 
These findings have three broader implications, which concern, respectively, our understanding 
ofEuropean integration, general theories of  the role of  ideas and individual leaders in foreign 
policy-making, and the proper use of  historical and social scientific methods in qualitative research. 
A. European Integration: The Primacy of  Political Economy 
For those concerned with regional integration, as well as the sources of international economic 
cooperation more generally, the relative importance of  geopolitical and economic motivations is a 
critical theoretical issue. Ever since the debate between neo-functionalists and their critics in the 
early  1960s,  there  have  been two basic  explanations  of the  fundamental  national  interests  and 
motivations underlying European integration.  One stresses geopolitical  interest and  ideas.  In this 
view,  European  governments  that  supported  integration  have  been  primarily  concerned  with 
perceived security externalities, which reflected either objective threats or subjective perceptions of 
national prestige. The EC was designed to strengthen Western cohesion against the Soviet threat, to 
prevent yet another Franco-German conflict by linking the restoration of  West German sovereignty 
to a firm commitment to integration, to enhance the global prestige of  European governments vis-a-
vis both superpowers or to advance a federalist vision of  governance "beyond the nation-state" vis-
a-vis  more  old-fashioned "nationalist" or Realist  conceptions of the  nation-state.  Opposition to 
European integration was a function of  nationalism, extremist ideology, divergent colonial legacies, 
and idiosyncratic geopolitical perspectives and political traditions.
154 
72 The great majority of  historical and social scientific analyses ofEuropean integration stress 
geopolitical interests and ideas. This lies at the core of  nearly all historical analyses of  European 
integration, of  the dominant Realist interpretation of  the stability of  the post-World War II balance 
of  power in Europe, and of  most contemporary commentaries about European integration. tss Even 
neo-functionalists, who stress the ultimate preeminence of  economic interest, concede to their 
foremost critics, notably Stanley Hoffmann, both that initial decisions to integrate are taken for 
geopolitical reasons and that "dramatic-political actors" motivated by nationalism or geopolitical 
concerns could economic integration for long periods oftime. 
1s
6 This consensual support for the 
geopolitical explanation of  European integration is based in large part on the received wisdom about 
de Gaulle's policies. 
The second explanation stresses the interest of  governments in promoting the economic welfare 
of  their citizens and, above all, powerful domestic producer groups. In this view, the EU has been 
designed primarily to increase export opportunities for industrialists and farmers, to modernize the 
economies of  European governments, to coordinate effective regulation of  environmental and other 
externalities,  and  the stabilize  the  macroeconomic  performance of its  member  states.  The EC 
captured  the  gains  from  rapidly  rising  intra-sectoral  trade  in  agriculture,  trade  diversion  in 
agriculture and regulatory policy coordination.  This remains a  minority view, but has substantial 
support among economists, economic historians and scholars in international political economy. 
1s
7 
This analysis challenges this consensus at its strongest point. Commercial interests, we have 
seen, were dominant, even in those cases where it has long appeared that geopolitical interests and 
ideology were strongest. De Gaulle's European policy is, moreover, what Harry Eckstein termed a 
73 "crucial case."
158 If  it can be shown that deGaulle.was.not~oti.vat-ed by geopolitical goals-or was 
not successful in realizing those goals-there is good reason to expect economic explanations to 
perform well in explaining the motivations of  other European leaders. A more detailed discussion of 
European integration, which would put de Gaulle's policies in the context of  major EC decisions 
from 1955 to 1991, would take us beyond the scope of  this essay. This issue is treated in more detail 
in the book from which this article is excerpted. It suffices here to note here that such an analysis, 
like the analysis in this article, supports a revision of  much of  the received wisdom about the history 
European integration. 
159 
B. Ideas and Democratic Foreign Policy: A SkepticaJ Note and a General Proposition 
The role of ideas in foreign policy-making has recently reemerged a central focus of scholarly 
inquiry.  Thirty years ago "idealism" was juxtaposed against "realism" of foreign policy. 
160  There 
has  subsequently been a steady stream of studies of the role of individual leaders and  visionary 
ideas in  foreign policy-a literature in which de Gaulle plays a prominent role. 
161  In recent years 
these arguments have been resurrected by  "constructivist" and  liberal  analyses of foreign  policy, 
which  seek to explain  foreign  policy  by  reference  to variation in  the "identity" and  "ideas" of 
societal actors and national leaders. 
162 
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74 Here, as in the_ case of geopolitical explanations of European integration, de Gaulle's foreign 
policy constitutes a "crucial" case.  The General is consistently cited as  the modem example par 
excellence  of the  visionary  statesmen,  a  nationalist  for  whom  idiosyncratic  understandings  of 
"grandeur," "sovereignty," and "prestige" were the primary ends of  policy, and living embodiment 
of  the continuing relevance of  a voluntaristic, anti-technocratic view toward foreign policy-making. 
De  Gaulle  constructed his  own  constitutional  order,  an  enduring  system .of centralized  foreign 
policy-making, and an ideology that persists to this day. No postwar democratic chief executive has 
enjoyed greater independence from domestic partisan constraints, broader executive prerogatives or 
a deeper commitment to distinctive geopolitical ideas.
163 
Yet the  case  of de  Gaulle's  European  policy  suggests  that  even  the  most  of independent 
democratic  politicians  is  a democratic  politician  nonetheless,  decisively  limited  by  the  need  to 
generate support from  influential constituencies.  Where de Gaulle could carry the day with mass 
ideological appeals, he was able to fashion an idiosyncratic ideologically-grounded foreign policy; 
where  he  faced  organized  interests,  he  failed  to  do  this.
164  De  Gaulle's  biographers  and 
commentators concede this point in principle. Hoffmann has observed: 
His  leadership,  clearly,  was  not  equally  innovative  in  all 
domains ... .In  foreign  affairs,  where  elites were  divided,  the public 
more  indifferent  than  enthusiastic,  he  moved  whenever  he  thought 
that his  actions would  succeed  [whereas]  when effective innovation 
required not mere acquiescence by an undifferentiated public but the 
active cooperation of  the groups the reform would affect, he refrained 
from  trying  to  get  his  ideas  realized,  [as]  in  the  whole  domain  of 
Robert W.  McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs (Princ«on, NJ: Princ«on University Press, 
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164 Philip Cerny, Politics of  Grandeur,  10, argues that "the concept of~  was  ...  to aeate a new and deeper sense of  national unity that would 
mabie the traditional cleavages in  Frendl political life to be overcome by reinforcing the conSCilsus around a st.rengdlened and dynamic state that 
incarnated the national interest." 
75 business-worker relations ....  From the start, he  was  more concerned 
wi~  and at ease i~ security and foreign affairs. 
165 
Hoffmann's analysis is insightful and  correct, but the conclusion about European integration that 
follows  from  it is the opposite of the one Hoffmann himself drew.  Hoffmann treats de Gaulle's 
European policy as foreign policy or ''high politics"; yet Hoffmann's own criteria suggest that it 
should be viewed in fact as a "domestic" or "low politics" issue. 
This  distinction  is  critical.  Viewed  from  the perspective of general  theories of comparative 
fo~ign policy,  this  suggests  the  existence  of clear  limits  on  conduct  of an  ideationally·  or 
ideologically-based foreign policy in a modern democracy. Even the most institutionally insulated 
and electorally powerful among democratic politicians finds it nearly impossible to pursue policies 
that impose heavy losses on concentrated groups in order to achieve diffuse ideational goals,  no 
matter how strongly the latter are held.  In  contrast to the General's policies toward NATO, the 
Soviet Union, the Third World, Quebec, or even nuclear weapons-in each of which the role of 
concentrated economic interests was either marginal  or, as with the arms and  nuclear industries, 
supportive of the policy in question-the EC was primarily an economic organization. EC policies 
mobilized strong, consistent pressure powerful economic interest groups utterly impervious to the 
ideological  or plebiscatory  appeals  that were  the  political  basis  of Gaullist  rule.  These  groups 
predated  de  Gaulle  and  they  would  outlive  him.  From  this  perspective,  the weaknesses  of de 
Gaulle's  European  policy  resulted  primarily  from  his  difficulty  in  accepting  that  European 
integration was  not foreign  policy.  The  greatest  failures  of de  Gaulle's European  policy,  as  the 
aftermath of  the 1965 elections demonstrates, were attributable to his inability to transform issues of 
primary concern to industrialists and  farmers into issues decided by a direct relationship between 
public opinion and the presidency. Where strong geopolitical and strong economic imperatives were 
1~  Hoffmann, "De Gaulle as an Irmovative Leader.~  70. 
76 both at stake, the' latter prevailed. 
166 Hence considerations of  "high politics" triumphed in nuclear 
and  alliance politics, whereas considerations of "low politics" triumphed in trade and  regulatory 
policy. 
A large dose of  common-sense skepticism about ideational explanations of  foreign policy is thus 
warranted. This conclusion challenges claims about the importance of  individuals and their ideas-
claims at once sweeping and undet:specified-held both by many traditional diplomatic historians 
and  by recent  ·~constructivist" analyses of  foreign policy-making.  Some of the latter stress as  a 
matter of  meta-theoretieal dogma that variation in ideational "identities" must precede variation in 
material ''interests." This analysis provides solid empirical.support for more measured analysis of 
the role of ideas in foreign policy, which limit their impact to cases in which material interests are 
weak or uncertain.
167 Further research in this area might begin from the distinction between "high" 
and "low" above. Concretely, we should expect to see more ideological statecraft where states are 
either  undemocratic  or where  the  issues  in  question  do  not  directly  confront  the  interests  of 
concentrated groups. Finally, this finding challenges the tendency, of  which Hans Morgenthau and 
Kenneth Waltz are the foremost exponents, to think of security affairs as the most "deterministic" 
realm  of world  politics,  the  issue-area  most  constrained  by  "systemic" factors.
168  This  analysis 
suggests that the diffuse "public goods" quality of security threats means they are more prone to 
ideological redefinition, whereas economic interests tend to be more sharply and strongly defined. 
166 However, for evidence that even in at Jealil one narrow area of defense policy, when economic and geopolitical imperatives did clash in defmse 
policy. economic ones prevailed. Andrew Moravcsik. "Armaments among Allies: Franco-German Weapons Cooperation, 197S.198S." In Pd.er Evans, 
Harold Jacobson  and Robat Putnam.  eds.,  Double-Edged  Diplomacy:  International  Bargaining and Domelilic  Politics (Bak.eley: University  of 
California Press. 1993), 128-168. 
167 Goldlilein and Keohane, "Introduction," in Goldlilein and Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policv. 
77 C. The Methodology of  Case-Study Analysis: Primary Sources and Qualitative Methods 
This study suggests, finally, the decisive importance of adherence to rigorous methodological 
standards when conducting qualitative or case-study research. Many have called recently for more 
intense interchange between historians and political scientists.  Historian Gordon Craig succinctly 
summarizes  its optimistic  spirit when he  asserts that political  scientists would "profit from  the 
fidelity to milieu et moment" and the greater use of primary sources, while historians might learn 
"analytical techniques employed by their partners new questions to ask [and] new ways to test the 
validity of  their hypotheses. "
169 From the side of  political science, there have been recent calls for 
"analytic narratives," that is,  "accounts that respect the specifics of time and place but within  a 
framework  that  both  disciplines  the  detail  and  appropriates  it  for  purposes  that transcend  the 
.  I  ,11o  parttcu ar story. 
Yet there remains considerable ambiguity about what, if anything, this means for the practical 
conduct of empirical research.  Much is also being written on qualitative case study methods, yet 
few demonstrations that rigorous methods actually matter. This study demonstrates that such debate 
is not simply methodological abstraction; choices of method have decisive empirical implications. 
This case suggests that the application of rigorous methods  can  generate a significant  historical 
revision  even  in  the  face  of an  enormous,  uniform  literature.  Biographers  and  foreign  policy 
168 Kenneth N. Wahz, Theory of  International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Morgenthau, Politics among Nations.(-); Lipson WP 
article(  ..  ). 
169 Gordon  Craig,  "Presidential  Address."  in  American  Historical  Revill\'11  88: I  (February  1983),  CITE.  Scholars ina-easingly  concede that the 
Lmderlying  explanatory pwposes of the two fields are similar and the techniques they employ complementary.  See "Symposium [on  Diplomatic 
History and International  Relations Theory," International  Security 22:1  (Summer 1997). Recent work on qualitative methods reformulate social 
scientific techniquli!S for use in  case studies. but say little about the "craft" of case study writing. in particular the use of  historical techniques for 
seleaing and interprding sources.  See Gary King.  Robert  0. Keohane,  and  Sidney  Verba,  Designing Social  IDquiry:  Scientific IDfcrence  in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press,  1994);  Andrll\'11  Beruldt and Alex.ander George, "Developing and Using Typological 
Theories in Case Study Research," (Paper presented at the 381b Annual Convention ofthe International Studies Coovall.ion, 18-22 Mardi 1997). 
170 
Margaret Levi, "Producing an Analytic Narrative." 4.  "Analytic narratives." as employed by Levi and her collaborators. refers to the uae of case 
studies to test general deduttive propositions by seeking to eJqJiain previously unexplained variation within the case. This is consistent with  ocher 
writings on qualitative methods, thougb tbe use of  game theory in most of  tbe analyses by Levi et al. is incidental to the basic methodological point. 
Th~  ~er  implications of  this method drawn below-the explicit use of  COqJeting hyp«heses I!Dd Ute i1J110111RI:C Of primary sources-arc my  OWft 
additions and are not elaborated by these analysts.  IS.  See,  for  example,  Jan  Lusti<:k,  "History,  Historiography and Political  Science:  Multiple 
Historical Reoords and the Problem ofSeleaion Bias," American Political Science Review 90:3 (September 1996), 605-618; 
78 analysts have overlooked the primacy of  commercial concerns in de Gaulle's foreign policy in large 
part because they have employed faulty methodology. 
In this regard, de Gaulle's foreign policy toward Europe is again a "crucial case," since it is hard 
to imagine a  scholarly consensus deeper than the one supporting a  geopolitical  and  ideological 
interpretation of the General's actions.  Why, after thirty years,  do nearly all  writers on Gaullist 
policy toward Europe remain in the thrall of  the General's seduction? Why does this study come to 
a revisionist conclusion? And why, the reader might well ask, should this study be considered more 
reliable than the existing scholarly consensus? · 
The most fundamental difference between this study and the existing literature on de Gaulle is 
methodological.  Any  attempt to revise  a  historical  consensus  must  stake its  claim  to be taken 
seriously on the presentation of  new primary data or the use of  more objective and rigorous methods 
to analyze it.  This study advances both claims. The existing literature, I have argued, tends both to 
rely on public and secondary sources and tends to impose a priori an unwarranted biographical and 
philosophical unity on de Gaulle's foreign policy. 
We  know from  the first  section of this essay that a  prima facie  case  can be  made  for  the 
predominance of  either economic or geopolitical motivations. Yet amid the thousands of  books and 
articles on de Gaulle, only a handful systematically evaluate the relative importance of economic 
interest or issue-specific motivations in his European policy. Instead such "pragmatic" concerns are 
mentioned,  if at  all,  as secondary  or background  concerns.  In short,  a  reader basing his  or her 
judgement on the secondary literature alone-despite its enormous size--would have no way of 
objectively  evaluating  the  relative  importance  of economic  and  geopolitical  factors  in  French 
European policy.  Hence neither any single study nor all  studies taken together present a balanced 
portrayal of  the man and his policies; all simply seek to reconstruct a particular geopolitical vision. 
79 Aside from being misleading, one-sided imaginative reconstructions of  this kind are unfalsifiable. If 
any act can be explained either as a principled action or as a tactical exception, and no  alternative 
views  are  considered,  by  what  objective  standards  can the  reader judge  the  adequacy  of the 
interpretation? Such analysis is neither rigorous nor replicable. 
An approach based on the imaginative reconstruction of the ideas of a theatrical statesman is 
particularly prone to reflect the preconceived notions of  the analyst.  This has encouraged selective 
citation and interpretation of evidence about de Gaulle to an unusual extent. Half sentences from 
prominent documents that refer  explicitly  and  exclusively to economic  interests  are  persistently 
cited out of all  context in favor of a geopolitical and ideological interpretation. I have repeatedly 
noted selective presentation of the two most commonly cited sources on de Gaulle's EC policy, 
namely  his  memoirs  and  his  press  conference  of 14  January  1963.  Even  most  associates  and 
ministers remain deliberately vague,  as  does Couve de Murville, or themselves openly engage in 
imaginative  reconstruction,  as  does  Pisani.
171  Many  documents  that  cast  a  unique  light  on  de 
Gaulle's policies are almost never  cited~ Peyrefitte's strategy document, for example, available in 
printed form since the mid-1960s, has is to my knowledge mentioned in only two relatively obscure 
commentaries.
172 
The three methodological principles employed  here--collection of a more  representative and 
more  reliable  sample of primary  data,  consideration of a full  range of competing  theories,  and 
derivation of competing hypotheses-Qffer good reason to expect that the results of this study are 
more reliable than those of  existing studies. At the very least, the theory, evidence and interpretation 
are thereby rendered more transparent and thus more easily replicable. 
171  Hence there is a striking divergence even within ministerial memoirs, whim tend to speculate openly that the General must have been mf1ivated 
primarily by geopolitical ideas, yet provide eviden~:eto  the contrary. E.g. Pisani, cited above (•• ). 
m Silj, Europe's; Jouve, General. 
80 This methodological discussion suggests general lessons for scholars those who seek to ground 
reliable historical generalizations in qualitative analyses of  case studies about world politics. Social 
scientists  (and  in  this  case,  historians  as  well)  must  accept the  careful  historian's  practice  of 
grounding inferences explicitly in a comprehensive reading of  confidential primary sources. Despite 
its unparalleled size, the state of scholarship on de Gaulle demonstrates why,  as  Ian Lustick has 
noted, it is dangerous for political scientists to base their analysis on selected secondary sources. 
But, moreover, this study challenges Lustick's preferred alternative, namely to rest analyses on an 
unbiased or comprehensive reading of availal11e  secondary sources.
173  At best, those who rely on 
them are condemned to repeat the wisdom of historians; at worst, they are condemned to repeat 
their errors. The case of  de Gaulle suggests that even two thousand nearly unanimous commentators 
might provide a biased, if not erroneous, explanation of a major historical episode.  For political 
scientists. there is no reliable alternative to primary source research. 
For their part, historians must accept, as  Gordon Craig recommends in the citation above, the 
social scientific practice of stating competing theories and hypotheses explicitly.  In a case like de 
Gaulle's  foreign  policy,  only  a  clear  a  priori  statement  of standards  for  confirmation  and 
disconfirmation  protect  the  reader  against  an  exaggerated  or one-sided  interpretation.  Many 
narratives appear convincing but are nonetheless misleading if not incorrect. Without adherence to 
methodological principles drawn from  both history (e.g.  the use of primary evidence) and  social 
science  (e.g.  explicit  consideration of alternative  theories  and  hypotheses),  social  scientists  and 
historians are condemned to repeat the conventional wisdom, right or wrong. 
171 l.ustick.. "HiSlory," 605-618. 
81 This methodological lesson is particularly important for those who stress the role of ''ideas" in 
world politics-whether traditional security studies specialists or modem "constructivists." Some 
constructivists have recently  _pr<:)_posed that theoretical claims about ideas be subjected to looser, less 
rigorously "positivistic" testing procedures than those about material causes.
174 Some examine only 
the  immediate  justifications  offered  by  statesmen.  This  study  demonstrates  a  contrary,  more 
commonsensical  view  is  more  appropriate:  namely  ideational  claims  should  be  subjected  to 
particularly  intensive  testing,  especially  when  material  interests  offer  a  plausible  alternative 
exp1anation.  The reason is obvious:  It is generally much easier to alter one's geopolitical ideas to 
suit  economic  interests  than  the  reverse-as de  Gaulle's  "deliberate  deception"  demonstrates. 
Whereas de Gaulle initially tried and failed to induce a shift in the fundamental structure of  French 
agriculture to fit  his  ideas,  it  was  much  easier for  him  to craft new  ideational  claims  or,  more 
precisely, to exploit the ambiguities in Gaullist ideology to justify new policies. Statesmen routinely 
pepper their speeches vague symbolic appeals, many of  which are disingenuous, others of  which are 
sincere yet not decisive. Those who invoke either federalist or Gaullist ideology to explain positions 
on European integration typically ignore malleability of  such ideas. In the decade before 1958, we 
have seen, the Gaullists were successively strongly federalist, critical of  federalism, silent, favorable 
again,  then  ended  up  supporting  a  rather  centralized  agricultural  policy.
175  Symbols  can  be 
important, but they must always be weighed against the real cost of  realizing them. 
114 Thomas Band!of[ "Conceptual Approadlesto German Policy in Europe: Making Sense of  Continuity," Woddng Paper Series No. 7.9 (Univenity 
of  California Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, April 1996  ); ADD Cl1ES. 
m  The  same is true of federafults  in  Fnmce, wbo w«e oemc:red in the party of Jean  Monnet  and  Robert  Sdtuman, the Mouvemeat  Populaire 
Republicain (MRP), which did niX beoomepr<rEuropean until 1948-1949. See Bentein.. Mayeur, and Milza, Le MRP. 
82 IV. CONCLUSION 
The  secret of de  Gaulle's popularity among historians  and  commentators is  identical to the 
secret of  his popularity with the French public: he appeals to their literary sense, their desire to tell a 
compelling,  heroic  story.  For thirty  years  a  consensus  among  historians  and  commentators  has 
recapitulated with remarkable uniformity the public image deliberately crafted by an extraordinarily 
theatrical statesman.  Historical revision grounded in primary sources and  careful  social  scientific 
methods  suggests  that  this  account  is  largely  incorrect.  De  Gaulle  was  first  and  foremost  a 
democratic politician seeking the same things as other French politicians: economic welfare for his 
constituents. His was an "audacious" policy, but one conducted with "prudence," which took the 
form of  a constant awareness, sometimes imposed by his closest associates, of  the need to meet the 
underlying  demands of powerful  domestic  economic  interest groups; to disguise the nature  and 
increase the legitimacy of  this policy, de Gaulle sought to "seduce" French public and elites with an 
ideology that was in part "deliberate deception" and in part honest expression of his world view. 
Yet throughout-in striking contrast to his policies toward NATO, nuclear weapons, and at least his 
rhetoric  concerning superpowers and  the  Third  World-geopolitical interests and  ideology were 
secondary.  If he differed  from his  predecessors and  successors, it was in the domestic means he 
employed to realize these goals, not the goals themselves. 
This  conclusion  is  supported  by  the  great  preponderance of direct  evidence  available to us 
today.  Whether we  examine de  Gaulle's public  rhetoric,  confidential  evidence of the  expressed 
motivations of decision-makers, the timing of policy changes, the nature of negotiating tactics, or 
the nature of domestic pressures, the conclusion is  clear.  By contrast, the evidence suggesting the 
importance of geopolitical interest and  ideology  is  almost  entirely  speculative.  It is  grounded in 
imaginative reconstructions resting on de Gaulle's general public statements about foreign policy, 
not his specific statements, in public and above all in private, concerning the EC. 
83 There nonetheless remains much more to betsaid about French polic:ftow3ftf Europe urider de 
Gaulle, not least because primary documents from this period has only begun to be made available 
to  scholars.  (Though persistent rumors have  it  that  many  have· already  been destroyed.)  In this 
regard, the most important consequence of employing more rigorous qualitative  methods"is  not, 
therefore, that the findings  are ·necessarily  conclusive,  but that they are fair,  even generous,  to 
potential critics.  More rigorous methods ease the critic's task by rendering more transparent the 
analyst's  choice  of the  fundamental  theoretical  issue  at  stake,  the  derivation  of hypotheses 
employed to explore it, the data selected to ev~luate it, and the nature of  causal inference from that 
data. New theories and new data can more easily be assembled to challenge this interpretation. This 
explanation of de  Gaulle's policy toward European integration is  thus  intended  not to foreclose 
future debate, but to renew it. 
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